Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

but it does not show by natural reason that this part must be known beforehand. And in this way, the aforesaid reasons, as they are natural, conclude about one part of the contradiction—this one or that one—not definitely about this one except only from things believed.

To the Arguments

for the opinion

To the first: I say that cognition depends on the knowing soul and the known object. Because according to Augustine, 9th of The Trinity, last chapter: "From the knower and the known, knowledge is born." Therefore, although the soul has sufficient active and passive power within itself insofar as the action regarding cognition pertains to the soul, it does not, however, have within itself the sufficient active [power] insofar as action pertains to the object, because it is then like a bare tablet, as is said in [De Anima] 3. Therefore, the agent intellect, by which it is to make all things, is [the intellect] insofar as action pertains to the soul regarding cognition, and not insofar as the object is active.

To the Confirmation

To the confirmation of the reason, I say regarding the major premise that "nature" is sometimes taken for an intrinsic principle of motion or rest, as is described in the 2nd of Physics. Sometimes it is taken for an active principle naturally, as "nature" is distinguished against "art" or "purpose," because of the opposite mode of originating. In the first way, the major is not true because a natural active principle does not correspond to every passive power, because many things are naturally receptive to some perfection of which they do not have an intrinsic active principle. In the second way, also, the major proposition is false in certain cases when, namely, nature—because of its excellence—is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot be subject to the causality of a natural agent. And so it is in the proposal. When the major is proved, I say that the passive power is not in vain, because although it cannot be reduced to act primarily by a natural agent, it can be induced to the disposition for it through such an agent, and can be completely reduced

to act by some agent in nature—that is, in the whole coordination of beings—for instance, by a supernatural agent. Confir. But if it is objected that that signifies nature that it itself cannot attain its perfection from natural [means], since nature least fails in more noble things, from the 2nd of On the Heavens and the World Aristotle's De Caelo: I respond that if our happiness consisted in that supreme speculation, to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say nature fails in necessities. But now I concede that that can be naturally had, and beyond this I say another, more eminent [one] can be naturally received, which dignifies nature more than if the supreme possible for it were posited as merely natural. Nor is it a wonder that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality extends to. That, however, which he adds from the 2nd of On the Heavens and the World is not to the point, because the Philosopher speaks there of organs bodily/sensory instruments corresponding to the motive power. If it were in the stars, that nature would have given them organs, and I concede universally that to whom a power is given that is born to be organic, to him is given by nature the organ in those not deprived [of it]. I say: but in the proposal, I say that the power is given, but not an organic one; nor, however, are all other things concurring to the act, besides the power, naturally given. From the Philosopher there, it can therefore be held that what is naturally orderable to some act or object naturally has the power

The marginal notes are fragmented, but suggest a discourse on the soul's natural capacity versus the need for grace (the "third way"), clarifying that the intellect's passive potentiality does not imply a natural organ or automatic access to supernatural revelation, reflecting the scholastic distinction between natural faculty and gratuitous divine gift.

to that, and the organ if [there are] subsequent things required for the act. Otherwise, however, one could say to the major that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as passive is compared to the received act—the distinction of the members is clear in the beginning of the resolution of the question. The minor, however, is true in the second way, not the first. But it could be said more easily in the third way regarding the minor, by denying that, although the possible intellect is absolutely naturally receptive of such intellection, it is not so, however, for this state. The cause of which will be told below in the third distinction.