Questions on the Four Books of Sentences

St. Thomas, previous passage

Regarding distinction 2, as it concerns the first part, it is not admitted.

...the astronomer does not... well-known... St. Thomas, 1st distinction, question 1, article 2, response to 3rd objection.

It seems clearly expressed by the same [author] to the tobacco likely a scribal error or obscure reference in the manuscript for "the work" (tobacum/opus) of Scotus... that theology and natural [science] are not distinguished in the whole, which is considered in the body... human nature... receives principles... the astronomer... other theology, and thus is the distinction of these habits...

Regarding the second [argument], it is said:

of different reason

That a different reason for what is knowable induces a diversity of sciences. The astronomer and the natural philosopher demonstrate the same conclusion, for instance, that the earth is round. But the astronomer [demonstrates it] through a mathematical medium, that is, one abstracted from matter. The natural philosopher, however, [demonstrates it] through a medium considered in relation to matter. Hence, nothing prohibits the same things that the physical sciences treat—insofar as they are knowable by the light of natural reason—from also being treated by another science insofar as they are known by the light of divine revelation.

Against this: If it is possible for knowledge to be provided concerning knowable things in theology, as in other sciences, even if by a different light, then theological knowledge regarding them is not necessary. The consequence is evident in his example: because one knowing the earth to be round through a physical medium does not need knowledge of it through a mathematical medium as something simply necessary. The response given to the second [objection] is explained thus: a habitus mental disposition or habit of knowledge is both a habit and a form. Insofar as it is a habit, it has a distinction from the object. Insofar as it is a form, it can be distinguished from the active principle. But with respect to a scientific habit, the principles are the efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable thing—for instance, that the earth is round—there is no distinction through the objects, nevertheless there is a distinction there through the principles by which the mathematician and the physicist demonstrate this, and thus there is a distinction of the habits insofar as they are forms. Against this: A form is common to a habit, because every habit is a form, and not conversely. It is impossible, however, for something to be distinct in the concept of the superior [category] and not be distinct in the concept of the inferior. Therefore, it is impossible for things to be distinct in the concept of form and yet be indistinct in the concept of habits. This would be as if something were distinct in the concept of "animal" and indistinct in the concept of "human." Furthermore, he supposes that the principles are distinctive of the habit of the conclusion in another genre, as if they were effective principles. This is false, because if they have any reason for being a distinctive cause in relation to these habits, they do not have it...

He wishes to say, as in distinction 2, he declares [that] St. Thomas solves... the distinction in reason.

...except by reason of an efficient cause. Furthermore, the argument always stands that, however many distinct cognitive habits could be posited, the necessity of one habit is not saved—as if other knowledge were impossible by positing the possibility of another habit, however distinct. Therefore, I answer the argument that in those speculative sciences, even if they treat of all speculable things, they do not treat of them insofar as they are knowable, because they do not [treat] them insofar as their own proper knowable aspects are concerned, as appeared before in the third principal argument against the opinion of the predecessors.

here he insists

Regarding the third [argument], one answers:

And he denies why not... the terms... for their nature.

...thus: that first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions except sensible ones. This is both because their terms are abstracted from sensible things and thus have the flavor of their nature, and because the agent intellect, through which the application must be made, is limited to sensible things.

Against this: It is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensible things but in insensible ones. Indeed, one does not doubt more that contradictory statements are not simultaneously true regarding the same immaterial and material thing; therefore, the response is null. And what is said, that the term of the first principle is "being," which is divided into ten categories, and that this does not extend to the theological object—this is worth nothing, because we do not doubt more that contradictory statements are not simultaneously true regarding God than regarding another thing, such as that God is blessed and not blessed.

regarding the terms... not...

Another response is given that from major premises alone, conclusions do not follow, but [only] when combined with minor premises. Now, however, the minor premises that must be joined to them are not naturally manifest.

regarding... negation

Against this: The minor premises to be assumed in first principles predicate concerning things assumed under the subject terms of the first principles. But it is known that the terms of the first principles are predicated of everything, because they are most common.

minor terms

Therefore, I answer that the second part of the minor is false: namely, that in first principles, all knowable conclusions are virtually included.

Regarding the proof, I say that yes, the subject terms...

...regarding the terms...

The proposition, and thus here from Guac... denies that from minor premises... and what he says, that "being" which becomes learned... is not distinct in the concept... for "being"... which he says... in four, and... finite and infinite... finite... being infinite...