Annotations, Errors, and Corrections on the works of Avicenna, composed by Symphorien Champier, Golden Knight and Lord of Faverges.

To the most holy Prelate and his lord, Robert Coluburn, Bishop of Ross in Scotland, a man most erudite in the best things, Symphorien Champier, Lord of Faverges, sends greetings.

A large decorative drop cap 'G' features white interlaced strapwork and stylized foliage set against a dark, textured background within a square border.Antiquity so admired Galen original: "Galenum" from the beginning that, after Hippocrates, it praised that most holy man rather than followed him. But many centuries later, when Avicenna professed medicine under the most filthy and nefarious Mahometan sect original: "mahomethea... secta", the name of Avicenna spread and shone among the Spaniards, so that he was then called not merely an interpreter of Galen, but the prince of physicians. Nor, therefore, was anyone considered worthy of this title of medicine who had not come forth from the workshop of Avicenna, for he possessed sufficient titles and esteem to merit being called an Avicennist. Therefore, most worthy Prelate, I desire with a most prompt spirit to amend and annotate not only the doubts you once asked of me concerning Magdalene, but now also the Errors of Avicenna, whether by tongue or by letter. But lest the discourse wander outside the boundaries of the intended work, now the sails must be unfurled and the harbor sought; now the hand must be applied to the little work, and I fear that while I begin to form an amphora, I may end up fashioning a pitcher. You, most learned Prelate, gladly accept this small gift, whatever it may be. If it suits your stomach, it is well. Live and farewell, remembering your Champier, and may you love us as a Symphonian.

Avicenna

But we know that the soul

is not one in all bodies. Furthermore, attributing existence to the soul is not a body, nor is it a bodily virtue, but without doubt an essence existing naked from matter and measures. Avicenna and his summarizer, Algazel, speak in the same way concerning the agent and possible intellect. For Avicenna, in the fifth part of his sixth book of natural philosophy, says that the human soul is first intelligent in potentiality, then becomes intelligent in actuality.
Aver.

But everything that exits from potentiality to actuality does not do so except through a cause that already has this in actuality and draws it out. Therefore, this is the cause through which our souls exit from potentiality to actuality in intelligible things; but the cause that gives the intelligible form is none other than the intellect in actuality, in whose power are the principles of abstract intelligible forms. Its comparison to our souls is like the comparison of the sun to our eyes. For just as the sun is seen by itself in actuality, and it sees the light of itself in actuality, which it did not see in actuality before, so is the disposition of this intelligence regarding our souls. The agent intellect is therefore like the sun, which draws our souls from potentiality to actuality through an illumination made in intelligible things. They wish this agent intellect to be separate and limited, and not only to be the principle of understanding but of creating forms; for this reason, he is called the datore formarum giver of forms among the Arabs. Avicenna held this opinion from Alexander, who wished the agent intellect to be nothing of our soul. And thus, the agent intellect and the powers of the soul are distinct.

Algazel

He says that the apprehension of universal

intellects belongs to the soul, which is a substance existing through itself. It is not a body, nor impressed in a body, nor does it perish when the body perishes, but remains living in perpetuity, whether happy or sad. What Algazel's opinion was regarding the soul is shown by many propositions, the first of which is this: The soul does not perish when the body perishes. We shall add also that it begins with the body. The second proposition of Algazel: Although souls come to be with bodies, they do not come to be because of the body. For it has been said that the body cannot be the cause of something coming to be from nothing, and much less of something coming to be that is not a body. The third proposition of Algazel: Every seed that is apt to receive a soul merits the arrival of a soul from the intelligible substance that is the principle for souls, by natural merit, not by chance or choice. For it would follow then that sometimes two souls would coincide in one body, which is inconvenient. The fourth proposition: The greatest pain on the day of judgment will be for those men who, although they were wise, lived badly. Algazel also says that he who grows in science and does not grow in good works and a good life will be distanced from God. And this opinion of Algazel seems sufficiently in harmony with the law of Christians. Arabia was a land pestilent to human peoples: thus was Mahomet, thus once was Ham and his offspring.

Averrhois

wished there to be a unique

intellectual soul in all men. He also posits that the intellect, both agent and possible, are two substantial parts of the intellectual soul. And it is the opinion of Averroes that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are substances, and not proper accidents but essential properties. Furthermore, that the agent intellect and the possible intellect are separate from matter, truly corporal and actual universals, and abstracted outside the soul. Furthermore, the soul is rational, which is separate in its being from matter and body; this opinion is erroneous among all. For as the Holy Scriptures teach, the intellectual soul is always created with the body and is simultaneously infused into it. For, to speak in the words of the moderns or the Averroists, the soul is simultaneously created and infused into the body. For the form that is produced as an instrument is simultaneously produced and informs. The intellectual soul is of this kind, therefore, etc. The matter is to inform the form, the matter. The entity that is produced to inform is placed in matter as soon as it is produced; it is in it. But for a form to be in matter is for the form to inform the matter. Because it is not intelligible that a form exists in matter and does not inform it. For at the same instant of time, the final disposition is introduced. The soul is created and infused, though at different (as some please) instants of nature. Wherefore Averroes seems to have erred regarding the intellect, like a pagan.