Physics

PHYSICS, BOOK I.

Since the knowledge and understanding of all methods, of which there are principles archai beginnings, causes aitia reasons for being, or elements stoicheia foundational parts, come from knowing these things (for we think we know each thing when we know the first causes and the first principles, and even the elements), it is clear that for the science of nature, we must first attempt to define the matters concerning the principles. The natural path of investigation is from those things that are more recognizable and clearer to us, towards those things that are clearer and more recognizable by nature; for the things that are recognizable to us are not the same as those that are recognizable in the absolute sense. Wherefore, it is necessary to proceed in this manner: from those things that are less clear by nature, but clearer to us, towards those things that are clearer and more recognizable by nature. To us, the things that are initially clear and manifest are those that are rather confused; later, the elements and principles become known from these as we divide them. Therefore, one must proceed from universals katholou general categories to particulars kath' hekasta individual instances. For the whole is more recognizable to perception, and the universal is a kind of whole; for the universal encompasses many things, like parts. The names of things have, in a certain way, undergone the same relation to their definition; for a name signifies a whole and does so indefinitely, like "circle," but the definition of it divides it into its particulars. And children, at first, address all men as "fathers" and all women as "mothers," but later they differentiate each of them.