A, 4. 187ᵃ 35 — 187ᵃ 30.

This passage discusses the transition from the "one" to the "many" and the nature of mixture and change in early Greek thought.

Others speak of combination and separation. Furthermore, they observe that contraries come to be from one another; therefore, they must have been present within. For if everything that comes to be must come to be either from beings or from non-beings, and it is impossible for it to come to be from non-beings (for all those who discuss nature agree on this opinion), they concluded that it necessarily comes to be from beings and things present within, which are imperceptible to us due to the smallness of their masses. This is why they say that everything is mixed in everything, because they observed everything coming to be from everything; but things appear different and are called by other names based on that which predominates in the mixture due to the multitude of the infinites. For they say that nothing is purely white, or black, or sweet, or flesh, or bone, but that the nature of a thing is thought to be what it has most of.

If the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknowable—that which is infinite in number or magnitude is unknowable as to how much it is, and that which is infinite in kind is unknowable as to what quality it has—and if the principles are infinite both in number and in kind, it is impossible to know the things composed of them. For we assume that we know the composite whole when we know from what and how many things it consists. Moreover, if it is necessary that where a part can be of any size in terms of magnitude and smallness, the thing itself can also be of any size (I mean by such parts that into which the whole is divided while being present within it), then if it is impossible for an animal or a plant to be of any size, it is clear that none of its parts can be either; for the whole would be the same. Flesh, bone, and such parts of an animal, and the fruits of plants, are examples. It is evident, therefore, that it is impossible for flesh or bone or anything else to be of any magnitude, whether towards the larger or the smaller. Furthermore, if all such things exist within one another, and they do not "come to be" but are "separated out" from what is already present, and they are named after what is in greater abundance, and if everything comes to be from everything—for instance, water being separated out from flesh and flesh from water—and every finite body is destroyed by a finite body, it is clear that it is not possible for everything to be present in everything. For if flesh were removed from the water, and another amount was generated by the separation from the remainder, even if the amount separated is always smaller, it will not, however, exceed a certain magnitude in its smallness. So, if the separation stops, not everything will be in everything (for flesh will not be present in the remaining water). If it does not stop but always allows for removal, there will be infinite finite things in a finite magnitude; this is impossible.