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9 Others have indeed touched upon this, but not sufficiently. For, in the first place, they agree that things come to be simply from "what is not," thus following Parmenides correctly; then it appears to them that if it is one in number, it is also one in potentiality. This makes the greatest difference. For we say that matter and privation are different, and that of these, the one—matter—is "what is not" only coincidentally, whereas privation is "what is not" in itself. And matter is close to, and in a way is, substance, while privation is not so in any way. Others make "the great and the small" A reference to the Platonic "indefinite dyad." "what is not," either together or separately. Thus, this mode of the triad is entirely different from ours. For they only progressed as far as seeing that there must be some underlying nature, but they make it one; even if one makes it a duality, calling it "the great and the small," it is nonetheless the same; for they overlooked the other [the privation]. For the remaining nature is a co-cause with the form of the things that come to be, just like a mother. But the other part of the opposition might often be imagined by one who turns their mind toward its destructive nature as not even existing at all. For when there is something divine, good, and desirable, we say that one thing is its opposite, and the other is what is naturally disposed to desire and reach out for it according to its own nature. But for them [the ancients], it follows that the opposite reaches out for its own destruction. Yet it is not possible for the form to desire itself, because it is not in need, nor for the opposite to desire it; for opposites are destructive to one another. But this is matter, just as if the female were to desire the male, or the ugly the beautiful; except that it is not ugly in itself, but coincidentally, nor is it female in itself, but coincidentally. It is destroyed and comes to be in one sense, but in another sense it does not. For as that in which [it exists], it is destroyed in itself; for the thing being destroyed—privation—is within it. But as potentiality, it is not in itself; it must be indestructible and ungenerated. For if it were to come to be, there must be something underlying it first, from which...