Works of Aristotle, Vol. I (Aristotelis Opera)

are said. And as primary substances relate to all other things, so the species and genera of primary substances relate to all the rest; for all the rest are predicated of these. For you will call a certain individual human "grammatical"; therefore, you will also call both "human" and "animal" "grammatical." The same applies to other cases as well.

It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. For a primary substance is neither in a subject nor said of a subject; and it is clear regarding secondary substances that they are not in a subject. For the individual human is said of a subject, namely the individual human, but is not in a subject; for "human" is not in the individual human. Likewise, "animal" is said of a subject, namely the individual human, but "animal" is not in the individual human. Furthermore, regarding things that are in a subject, nothing prevents the name from sometimes being predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be. However, of secondary substances, both the definition and the name are predicated of the subject; for you will predicate the definition of "human" of the individual human, and likewise that of "animal." Thus, substance could not be one of those things in a subject. Yet this is not a property of substance alone; rather, the differentia distinguishing characteristic also is not in a subject. For "pedestrian" original: "πεζὸν" and "two-footed" original: "δίπουν" are said of a subject, namely the human, but they are not in a subject; for "two-footed" or "pedestrian" is not in the human. And the definition of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said; for example, if "pedestrian" is said of "human," the definition of "pedestrian" will also be predicated of the human; for the human is pedestrian. Let us not be disturbed by the thought that parts of substances exist in the wholes as in subjects, lest we be forced to admit that they are not substances; for things in a subject were not said in that way, namely as parts existing in something.

It also belongs to substances and differentiae distinguishing characteristics that all things are said synonymously from them. For all predications from them are predicated either of individuals or of species. For there is no predication from a primary substance; for it is not said of any subject. But of secondary substances, the species is predicated of the individual, and the genus is predicated both of the species and of the individual.

Likewise, differentiae are predicated of species and individuals. Primary substances also admit the definition of species and genera, and species admit that of the genus; for whatever is said of the predicate will also all be said of the subject. In the same way, species and individuals admit the definition of the differentiae. Synonymous things are those whose name is common and whose definition is the same, so all things from substances and those from differentiae are said synonymously.

Every substance seems to signify a "this something." Now, in the case of primary substances, it is indisputable and true that they signify a "this something"; for what is indicated is individual and one in number. But in the case of secondary substances, although it appears similarly by the form of the designation to signify a "this something" when one says "human" or "animal," it is not true; rather, it signifies a "such-and-such" meaning a quality or type. For the subject is not one, as the primary substance is, but "human" and "animal" are said of many. It does not simply signify a "such-and-such," as "white" does; for "white" signifies nothing other than a quality. But the species and the genus determine the quality regarding the substance; for they signify a substance of a certain quality. The determination is made more broadly by the genus than by the species; for one who says "animal" includes more than one who says "human."

It also belongs to substances that there is no contrary to them. For what could be contrary to a primary substance, such as a specific individual human or a specific animal? There is nothing contrary to them. Nor is there anything contrary to "human" or "animal." This is not a property of substance alone, but also applies to many other things, such as quantity; for there is nothing contrary to "two-cubits long" or "three-cubits long," nor to "ten," nor to any such things, unless one were to say that "much" is contrary to "little" or "large" to "small." But among definite quantities, nothing is contrary to anything.

Substance seems not to admit of degree. I do not mean that one substance is not more or less a substance than another (for it has been said that it is), but that each substance is what it is, and is not said to be more or less so. For example, if this substance itself is "human," it will not be more or less "human," neither itself in relation to itself nor another in relation to another; for one is not more human than another, just as...