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The line is continuous; for it is possible to find a common limit original: "κοινὸν ὅρον" at which its parts join, namely a point, and for a surface, a line; for the parts of a plane join at a common limit. In the same way, regarding a body, one would be able to find a common limit, a line or a surface, at which the parts of the body join. Time and place are also among such things; for the "now" the present moment joins the past and the future. Again, place is among continuous things; for the parts of a body occupy a certain place, which join at a common limit; thus, the parts of the place, which each of the parts of the body occupies, join at the same limit at which the parts of the body join. Therefore, place would also be continuous; for its parts join at a single common limit.

Furthermore, some things are composed of parts that have a position thesis position/relative arrangement relative to one another, while others are not composed of things that have a position. For example, the parts of a line have a position relative to one another; for each of them is situated somewhere, and you could distinguish and state where each is situated on the plane and to which of the remaining parts it joins. Similarly, the parts of a surface also have a certain position; for it could be stated in the same way where each is situated, and which parts join one another. The same applies to the parts of a solid and of a place. But in the case of number, one would not be able to demonstrate that its parts have any position relative to one another or are situated somewhere, or which of the parts join one another. Nor is this true for the parts of time; for none of the parts of time persist; and how could that which does not persist have a position? Rather, you might say they have a certain order taxis sequence/arrangement in that one part of time is earlier and another is later. It is the same with number, in that one is counted before two, and two before three; and thus it might have a certain order, but you would not easily find a position. The same applies to speech; for none of its parts persists, but having been spoken, it is no longer possible to grasp it, so there would be no position of its parts, since none persist. Therefore, some things are composed of parts that have a position, and others are not.

Only the aforementioned things are strictly called quantities posa quantities, while all others are called so incidentally; for it is toward these

that we look when we call other things quantities. For instance, a white thing is called "much" large/abundant because the surface is large, and an action is called "long" lengthy because the time is long, and a movement is called "much." For each of these is called a quantity in its own right. For example, if someone defines how great an action is, they will define it by time, stating it is a year-long or "annual" or something similar. And defining a white thing as a certain quantity, one will define it by the surface; for whatever the size of the surface, they will say that the white is of that size. Thus, only the aforementioned things are strictly and in their own right called quantities, while none of the others are so in their own right, but rather, if at all, incidentally.

Furthermore, there is no contrary to quantity. For regarding specific things, it is clear that there is no contrary, such as to a two-cubit or three-cubit length, or to a surface, or any such thing; for there is no contrary to them, unless perhaps someone claims that "much" is contrary to "little" or "great" to "small." However, none of these is a quantity, but rather they are among relative things pros ti things related to something else; for nothing is called great or small in its own right, but by reference to something else. For example, a mountain is called small, but a grain of millet is called large because it is greater than other things of its own kind, while the former is smaller than things of its own kind. Therefore, the reference is to something else; for if it were called small or large in its own right, the mountain would never be called small, nor the grain of millet large. Again, we say there are many people in a village and few in Athens, although there are many times more in Athens, and many in a house but few in a theater, although there are many more in the theater. Furthermore, "two-cubit" and "three-cubit" and each such term signifies a quantity, but "great" or "small" does not signify a quantity but rather a relative; for "great" and "small" are considered in relation to something else. Thus, it is clear that these are among relative things. Furthermore, whether one considers these to be quantities or not, there is no contrary to them; for how could one say that something is contrary to that which cannot be grasped in its own right but is referenced to something else? Moreover, if "great" and "small" were contraries, it would follow that the same thing could receive contraries at the same time and that they themselves would be contrary to themselves. For it happens that the same thing is at once great and small; for it is small in relation to this, but this same thing is great in relation to another. Thus, it happens that the same thing is both great and small at the same time; thus it would receive contraries at the same time. But nothing seems...