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...the body is also destroyed (for the body is among the perceptible things), and when the body is not, the sense-perception is also destroyed, so the perceptible destroys the sense-perception along with it. But the sense-perception does not destroy the perceptible; for when the animal is destroyed, sense-perception is destroyed, but the perceptible will still exist, for example, the body, the hot, the sweet, the bitter, and all other things that are perceptible. Furthermore, sense-perception comes into being simultaneously with the sentient creature; for the sense-perception comes into being at the same time as the animal. But the perceptible exists even before the animal or sense-perception exists; for fire, water, and such things, from which the animal is constituted, exist even before the animal exists at all, or sense-perception, so the perceptible would seem to be prior to sense-perception.

There is a difficulty as to whether no substance is called a relative, as is commonly thought, or whether this is possible for some of the secondary substances. In the case of primary substances, it is true; for neither the wholes nor the parts are called relatives. For "a certain human" is not called "a human of someone," nor is "a certain ox" called "an ox of someone." Similarly for the parts; for "a certain hand" is not called "a hand of someone" meaning: a specific person's hand is not essentially defined by its relationship to the person in the same way a master is defined by a slave, but "a hand of someone," and "a certain head" is not called "a head of someone," but "a head of someone." Similarly for secondary substances; in most cases, for instance, "human" is not called "human of someone," nor "ox" "ox of someone," nor "wood" "wood of someone," but rather it is called "a possession of someone." In the case of such things, it is clear that they are not among the relatives. However, in the case of some secondary substances, there is a dispute; for instance, "the head" is called the head of someone, and "the hand" is called the hand of someone, and each of such things, so these would seem to be among the relative things. If, then, the definition of relatives has been given sufficiently, it is among the very difficult or impossible things to show that no substance is called a relative. But if not sufficiently, and relatives are those for which their being is the same as being in a certain way in relation to something, perhaps something could be said about them. The former definition follows all relatives, yet it is not the same thing for them to be relatives as it is to be what they are in relation to others. From these things, it is clear that if anyone knows some relative thing definitely, he will also know that in relation to which it is said definitely. This is clear from the things themselves; for if someone knows that this specific thing is among the relative things, and the being of relative things is the same as being in a certain way in relation to something, he also knows that to which this thing is related in a certain way. For if he does not know at all that to which this is related in a certain way, he will not even know if it is related in a certain way. This is also clear in the case of individual things; for instance, if he knows definitely that this specific thing is "double," he immediately knows definitely that it is double; for if he does not know it as double of any of the definite things, he does not even know at all that it is double. Similarly, if he knows that this specific thing is "more beautiful," it is necessary that he also knows immediately and definitely what it is more beautiful than because of these reasons. He will not know indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something "worse"; for such a thing becomes a mere supposition, not knowledge; for if he will know even precisely that it is more beautiful than something "worse," if it so happened, it is nothing worse than it. Thus, it is clear that it is necessary, whatever one knows definitely among relative things, to also know definitely that in relation to which it is said. But as for the head, the hand, and each of such things, which are substances, one can know definitely what they are themselves, but it is not necessary to know that in relation to which they are said. For whose head this is, or whose hand, one cannot know definitely. Thus, these would not be among the relative things. If these are not among the relative things, it would be true to say that no substance is among the relative things. Perhaps it is difficult to pronounce strongly upon such things without having examined them many times; however, to have raised the difficulty for each of them is not useless.

"Quality" original: "ποιότης" I define as that by which some things are called "of such a kind." Quality is a term used in many ways. Let one kind of quality be "habit" original: "ἕξις" and "disposition" original: "διάθεσις". Habit differs from disposition in that it is more lasting and more permanent. Such are the sciences and the virtues; for knowledge seems to be among the lasting and difficult-to-change things, even if one acquires knowledge only moderately, provided no great change occurs through illness or some other such thing. Likewise for virtue, for example, justice, temperance, and each of such things; it does not seem to be easily moved or easily changed. Dispositions are called those things which are easily moved and changing rapidly, such as heat and cold, illness, and health, and all other such things; for a person is disposed in a certain way according to these, but changes rapidly, becoming cold from being hot, and from being healthy to being ill.