Works of Aristotle, Vol. I (Aristotelis Opera)

...and likewise for other things, unless one happens to be well-established through length of time and is incurable or very difficult to change, which one might perhaps already call a hexis habit/state. It is clear that these are what they wish to call habits, which are more long-lasting and harder to change. For they say that those who do not fully possess the sciences, but are easily changed, do not have a habit, even if they are disposed in some way regarding the science, whether for the worse or the better. Thus, a habit differs from a disposition in that the latter is easily changed, while the former is more long-lasting and harder to change. Habits are also dispositions, but dispositions are not necessarily habits. For those who have habits are also disposed in some way according to them, but those who are disposed are not necessarily in possession of a habit.

There is another kind of quality according to which we call someone a boxer, a runner, healthy, or diseased, and in general, all those things that are spoken of according to a natural capacity or incapacity. For each of these is not called "qualified" meaning: possessing a specific quality because they are disposed in a certain way, but because they possess a natural capacity or incapacity to do something easily or to be unaffected. For example, boxers or runners are not called such because they are disposed in a certain way, but because they have a natural capacity to do something easily. Those who are healthy are called such because they have a natural capacity to remain unaffected by ordinary things with ease, while those who are diseased are called such because they have a natural incapacity to remain unaffected by ordinary things with ease. The same applies to the hard and the soft. For the hard is called such because it has a capacity to not be easily divided, and the soft is called such because it has an incapacity to do this very thing.

A third kind of quality includes pathetikai poiotētes affective qualities and pathe affections. These are things like sweetness, bitterness, astringency, and all things related to these; furthermore, heat, cold, whiteness, and blackness. That these are qualities is clear, for those things which have received them are called qualified according to them. For example, honey is called sweet because it has received sweetness, and a body is called white because it has received whiteness. The same applies to the others. They are called affective qualities either because the things themselves that have received the qualities have suffered something. For honey is not called sweet because it has suffered something, nor is anything else of that sort. Similarly, heat and cold are called affective qualities not because the things that have received them have suffered something, but because each of the mentioned qualities is productive of an affection according to the senses. For sweetness produces an affection in the sense of taste, and heat in the sense of touch, and likewise for the others. Whiteness, blackness, and other colors are not called affective qualities in the same way as the ones mentioned, but because they themselves have come to be from an affection. That many changes of color occur because of an affection is clear. For someone who is ashamed has become red, and one who is afraid has become pale, and each of these sorts of things. So, if one has naturally suffered some such affection due to certain natural symptoms, it is likely that they have the similar complexion. For whatever disposition of the body occurred during the state of shame, the same could occur according to a natural constitution, so that naturally the complexion also becomes similar. Therefore, as many of such symptoms as have taken their origin from certain difficult-to-change and lasting affections are called affective qualities. For whether paleness or blackness has come to be in the natural constitution, they are called qualities (for we are called qualified according to these), or if this same paleness or blackness has happened because of a long illness or heat, and they are not easily removed or even remain for life, they are also called qualities. For we are in like manner called qualified according to these. But those things which come from things that are easily dissolved and quickly removed are called affections, but not qualities. For we are not called qualified according to these. For the one who blushes because of shame is not called "a blusher," nor is the one who turns pale because of fear called "a paled one," but rather that they have suffered something. Thus, such things are called affections, and not qualities. Similarly, in the soul, affective qualities and affections are spoken of. For all those things that have come to be from the beginning from certain difficult-to-change affections are called qualities, such as madness

and anger and such things. For we are called qualified according to these, such as "irascible" or "mad." Likewise, even those states of being that are not natural, but have come about from some other symptoms and are difficult to remove or entirely unchangeable, such things are also qualities. For we are called qualified according to these. But those that come from things that are quickly removed are called affections, for example, if someone who is grieving is more irascible. For one who is more irascible while in such an affection is not called "an irascible person," but rather that they have suffered something. Thus, such things are called affections, but not qualities.

A fourth kind of quality is shape and the form existing around each thing, and in addition to these, straightness and curvature, and anything similar to these. For according to each of these, one is called "qualified." For to be a triangle or a square is said to be qualified, as is to be straight or curved. And according to the form, each thing is also called qualified. Rareness, density, roughness, and smoothness might seem to signify being qualified, but such things seem to be foreign to the division regarding quality. For each of these seems to signify a certain position of parts. For "dense" is defined by the parts being close to one another, and "rare" by their being separated from one another. And "smooth" is defined by the parts lying in a straight line in some way, and "rough" by one part being raised and another being lower.

Perhaps another mode of quality could appear, but these are almost entirely those most spoken of.

Qualities are, therefore, those mentioned, and "qualified" are things named paronymously according to these, or in any other way from them. For in most and almost all cases, they are named paronymously. For example, from whiteness comes "white," from grammar comes "grammarian," from justice comes "just," and likewise for the others. In some cases, because there are no names set for the qualities, it is not possible to be named paronymously from them. For example, a runner or a boxer, who is so named according to a natural capacity, is not named paronymously from any quality. For there are no names set for the capacities according to which these are called qualified, as there are for the sciences according to which they are called boxers or wrestlers by disposition. For "boxing science" and "wrestling science" are names, and those who are disposed are called qualified paronymously from these. Sometimes, even when a name is set, the thing called qualified according to it is not named paronymously. For example, from "virtue" comes "good" in Greek, spoudaios. For one is called good because they have virtue, but not paronymously from virtue. But such cases are not numerous. Therefore, those things are called "qualified" which are named paronymously from the mentioned qualities or in any other way from them.

There is also opposition regarding quality, such as injustice is contrary to justice, and whiteness to blackness, and the others likewise, and the things called "qualified" according to them, such as "the unjust" to "the just," and "white" to "black." This is not the case for all. For there is no contrary for "swarthy" or "pale" or such colors among the "qualified." Furthermore, if one of the contraries is a quality, the remaining one will also be a quality. This is clear by examining the other categories. For example, if justice is contrary to injustice, and justice is a quality, then injustice is also a quality. For none of the other categories will fit injustice. For it is neither a quantity, nor a relative, nor a place, nor anything of such a sort at all, but only a quality. The same applies to the other contraries regarding quality.

Qualified things admit of "more" and "less." For something is called more or less white than another, and more or less just than another. And it itself also takes on increase; for being white, it is still possible for it to become whiter. Not everything, but most things. For if one asks whether justice is called more or less than justice, one might be in doubt. The same applies to the other dispositions. For some dispute such matters; for they say that justice should not be called more or less than justice, nor health than health, yet one person possesses health less than another, and justice...