The Works of Plato

in what way to grant people justice and shame—should I distribute them as the arts are distributed? And the arts are distributed in this way: one who possesses, let us say, medicine, is sufficient for many who are ignorant of it, and so it is with other craftsmen; and does it mean, therefore, that I should establish justice and shame among people in this way, or should I allot them to everyone? — To everyone, said Zeus, — let all be partakers of them: there would be no cities if only a few partook of these virtues, as they do of other arts 70. And establish a law from me that anyone incapable of receiving shame and justice is to be put to death as a plague upon the city 71.

In this way, Socrates, and because of this, it came about that, just like others, the Athenians, when it is a matter concerning carpentry or any other craft, think that it is fitting only for a few to participate in deliberation, and if someone who does not belong to these few 72 offers advice, they do not accept it, as you say—and with good reason, I would add; — yet when they enter into deliberation concerning civic virtue, where

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shame and justice) are the bonds of cities through structures and the ties of friendship, as those who bring them together. — However, in Russian, even if one could call shame and justice the ties of friendship, one certainly cannot designate these virtues as structures or orders of cities. I think, however, that the true meaning of this beautiful passage has lost nothing in my translation.

70 ὥσπερ ἄλλων τέχνων just as of other arts — classifying shame and justice as arts, although with a distinction from other arts, is again evidence that the formal art of dissecting concepts had not yet reached its maturity in those times, which, however, did not prevent either the old Protagoras or the young Plato from expressing true and witty thoughts on the most important subjects.

71 Some commentators ask: if shame and justice are the portion of all people, then how can there be people who are devoid of them—and on this account they reproach Protagoras for light-minded and superficial reasoning. An obvious quibble and an unjust reproach! The assertion that shame and justice are allotted to all is not meant in the sense of arithmetic completeness, but only that these qualities, forming the moral nature of man, are inherent in all normal people in general, and not just in specific ranks of people, like some special or technical advantages. And the existence of individual moral anomalies does not contradict this in the slightest, just as the indisputable, I believe, universal human character of an organ such as the head is not in the least denied by the exceptional phenomenon of headless monsters.

72 ἐκτὸς ὤν τῶν᾿ὀλίγων being outside of the few.