Cleomedes' Circular Theory

...there were something, that again, if it were bounded, would need to be contained by a void: and this void again, unless it were infinite, would be contained by another body: which again would need to be contained by another void, since it too must have limits and boundaries: and this [would continue] even to infinity. Wherefore there will be bodies, both in number and magnitude infinite, of which nothing can be. Therefore, if the void that is outside the world is bounded, it is also entirely contained by something. It is not contained by a body: therefore it will be contained by an incorporeal thing. What, then, would that be? Time? A surface? One must say something of this sort. But it is not consistent with reason for the void to be contained by any of these. Therefore, there would need to be another void that contains it: and this too would need to be contained by another, if it is not infinite. Indeed, even this would be contained by another, even unto infinity; and thus, while we are unwilling to leave the void outside the world as infinite, we are meanwhile reduced to the point where it is necessary to leave an infinite variety of voids, which is absurd beyond measure. It is therefore necessary for us to confess that the void outside the world is infinite. Since, therefore, this void is infinite and lacks a body, there can be nothing "above" in it, nor "down": nor "before," nor "behind": nor "on the right," nor "on the left": finally, not even any middle. For these...

...were something, again this, being bounded, would need to be contained by a void. And this void, if it were not infinite, would be contained by another body; which itself also would again be contained by another void, and it too would have to have boundaries. And this would [continue] up to infinity; and thus, there would be bodies infinite in number and size, none of which is possible. So, if the void outside the world is bounded, it is entirely contained by something. But it is not contained by a body; it would be contained by an incorporeal thing. What would this be? Time? A surface? One must say something similar. But it is not reasonable for the void to be contained by any of these. Therefore, there would need to be another void containing it. And this would need to be contained by another, if it were not infinite. And this by another, up to infinity. And thus, not wishing to leave the void outside the world as infinite, we will be forced into the necessity of leaving an infinite variety of voids. Which is holding to the highest degree of absurdity. It is necessary, therefore, for us to acknowledge that the void outside the world is infinite. Being, therefore, at once infinite and incorporeal, it could have nothing "above," nor "below," nor "before," nor "behind," nor "to the right," nor "to the left," nor a "middle." For these seven relationships exist only when considered in relation to bodies.