Physiological Introduction or Principles of the Human Body

the extremes that it unites be separated. They confirm: the union is superadded to matter and form so that the indifference is removed; therefore, if the union were at least supernaturally indifferent to the extremes, it would need another entity that would remove this indifference. They subsume: but that second union would either be indifferent or it would not. If the first, a process to infinity would be given. If the second, then that which you say about the second union can be said about the first; therefore, the conclusion is true. Furthermore, because, although matter and form are present coexisting in the same instant, and even compenetrated, they do not yet make one "by itself." Thus, it is certain that the Body of Christ the Lord was penetrated with doors, walls, marble, etc., yet it cannot be said that it constituted one "by itself" from that. Therefore, a superadded mode is required, and indeed a substantial one, because a thing "one by itself" differs from a thing "one by accident" in that the former admits no accident among its constitutives. But among the constitutives of one "by itself" is also the union; therefore, the union is not an accident; therefore, it is a substantial superadded mode. Furthermore, because the formal union cannot

be the Decree of GOD, as we heard in the previous proof, nor dispositions, nor the negation of division, nor finally an absolute entity, or such an entity that is not really affixed to the extremes, since this would not sufficiently remove the indifference of the extremes. Therefore, it must be a modal entity which is a pure relationship, that is, an essential determination of two or more really distinct things to communicate predicates in the whole, and so that, by means of the union, predicates are communicated to the whole human body, not so much from the primary matter as from the rational soul, and indeed at least most of those that are not opposed to each other. Thus, man is not simultaneously material and spiritual, but only material, also corporeal, living, animated, rational, etc. The third reason is: because the union is separable from the matter and form; therefore, it is also really distinct from them. For that which is separable from another is also really distinct from it. Thus, after the death of man, the matter and form of man exist, yet the union does not exist; therefore, this can be separated from them; therefore, it is also really distinguished from them. The fourth reason is: Furthermore, because that is a part of the whole,