Physiological Introduction or Principles of the Human Body

the whole; if this is removed, while all other things remain, the denomination of the whole immediately perishes. But when the union between the matter and the form of the human perishes, the denomination of "human" immediately perishes: therefore, the union the binding together of matter and form is an essential part of the human. Furthermore, because the union is the intrinsic principle ut quo as that by which of the substantial whole in the finished state, according to our second assumption; but the human is a substantial whole in the finished state: therefore, the union is the principle ut quo of the human itself. They subsume: but that which is the intrinsic and essential principle ut quo of a substantial whole is also an essential part of the whole ut quo: therefore the union, since it is the said principle of the human ut quo, is also its essential part ut quo. And they subsume again: but the principle ut quo, that is, that by means of which the human is made through matter and the rational soul, is only a secondary principle, while the matter and the form of the human are primary principles and ut quod as that which: therefore, the union, since it is a principle ut quo, is a principle, that is, only a secondary part of the human body.

Moreover, this union is truly physical; for between matter and form there is no real identity of two things, as in a metaphysical union an identity of essence; nor is it merely a connection of two or more things

regarding their coexistence in any given place and time—and thus a logical union a connection of relation—but there is a connection of two or more really distinct things regarding the same indivisible place and time, and this connection is a physical union.

Questions Resolved.

Q. 1. Is the matter of natural things the primary elements? Our Galenists respond: No, which Aristotle affirms at length in original: "lib. gen. & int. c. 5." i.e., On Generation and Corruption, Book I, Chapter 5; for the matter of natural things is a certain common subject, which the elements are not, since these are already physical bodies and thus composed of a subject, i.e., prime matter, and a substantial form; they can, however, be the matter of a mixed body, at least as an integrating part.

Q. 2. Is prime matter such pure potency that it admits no entitative act, i.e., essence? They respond: No, for prime matter is outside of nothingness and is a real subject capable of sustaining forms: therefore it is an actual being, having, to wit, an act of essence; for matter is indeed a potency toward an act, but only toward a