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Having entered the school of Dionysius the Grammarian, I saw some youths of noble character, born of illustrious parents, and along with them their companions. There were also two certain young men contending with one another; but what the contention was, I had not sufficiently noted. Nevertheless, they seemed to be debating about Anaxagoras or OEnopides, describing circles and depicting certain inclinations of the sphere, leaning on their elbows, and being very intent. I, however, touching the friend of one of them, near whom I was sitting, with my elbow, asked why the youths were contending, and whether it was something great and beautiful, in which they were placing such study. "You, the one," he said, "what is 'great and beautiful'? They are trifling about certain sublime things, and babbling while philosophizing." Admiring his answer, I said, "O youth, does it seem shameful to you to philosophize? And why do you answer so bitterly?" The other, however (for a certain rival of that one was sitting nearby), when he had heard both me questioning and him answering, said, "It is not advantageous for you, Socrates, to ask this one whether he thinks philosophy is shameful or not. Do you not see that he has spent his entire life in a certain tumidity, satiety, and sleepiness, so that you believe he will answer you anything else than that philosophy is shameful?" Now, that one was learned in music, the other, whom he was disparaging, in gymnastics. And it seemed to me that I should let the one I had first questioned go, since he seemed to want to be considered exercised in doing rather than in disputing. But I decided to question the one who wanted to seem wiser, so that I might gain some utility if possible. I said, therefore, to him, "I have proposed this in common: if you think you will answer this better, I ask you the same thing now, whether it seems to you that to philosophize is beautiful, or otherwise?" When we were saying these things, the youths heard, and having left off the contention which was between them, they prepared themselves in silence to hear what we were discussing. And what happened to the lovers, I do not know. I myself certainly was astonished; for I am always amazed at new and beautiful things. It seemed, therefore, to me that the other was contending no less with me. He answered me, however, and indeed very ambitiously: "If at any time, O Socrates, I were to consider it shameful to philosophize, I would consider neither myself a man, nor anyone else who is so affected." Hinting, however, at his rival, he said these things with such a voice that his friends could hear. Here I said, "Does it seem beautiful to you, then, to philosophize?" "And most certainly," he said. "What then," I said, "does it seem to you possible that someone might know whether something is shameful or beautiful, unless he first knows what it itself is?" "No." "Do you know, then," I said, "what it is to philosophize?" "I know indeed." "What is it?" "What else but according to Solon? For Solon said somewhere, 'Growing old, I learn many things.' And it seems to me, indeed, that it is always necessary for that man to learn something, who is a philosopher..."