ERASTAE

"is to be learned in the arts in the way that you yourself said, that bad philosophers are useless as long as there are arts among men. But it is not so, O friend. Neither is it to philosophize to be studiously occupied around the arts, nor to be burdened with many businesses, nor to learn many things, but something else; since I think that this is absurd, and that those who are burdened with the arts are more rightly called mechanics. But we shall understand this more plainly in this way, whether I speak the truth or not, if you answer this: Who knows how to tame horses rightly? Those who render them better, or others?" "Those who render them better." "What about dogs? Do those who know how to render them better also know how to control them rightly?" "Entirely." "Is the same art, therefore, that which renders them better and controls them rightly?" "The same." "What about this? Does that which makes them better and controls them rightly discern the good and the bad, or another?" "The same," he said. "Do you wish, therefore," I asked, "that we establish the same for humans, that the same art which renders humans best is also that which controls them rightly and discerns who are good and who are bad?" "Absolutely," he said. "Is it not that whatever applies to one, the same applies to many; and what applies to many, applies to one?" "Yes." "And in horses furthermore and all others in the same way?" "In the same way," he said. "What science is it that rightly punishes the intemperate and the transgressors of the laws in the state? Is it not the judicial?" "Absolutely." "Do you call justice something else besides that?" "None," he said. "Does not the same science that rightly chastises and punishes also discern the good and the bad?" "The same." "But whoever knows one, will he also know the many?" "He will know." "But he who is ignorant of the many, will he also be ignorant of the one?" He agreed. "If, therefore, being a horse, he is ignorant of the good and bad horses, will he be ignorant of himself?" He conceded. "And if, being an ox, he does not know who are the good or bad oxen, is it necessary that he also be ignorant of what kind he himself is?" "It is so," he said. "In the same way, also, if he were a dog?" He confessed. "But now, when a man, being human, is ignorant of good and bad men, will he not also be ignorant of himself, whether he is good or bad?" He nodded. "To be ignorant of oneself, is it to be wise or to be foolish?" "To be foolish." "To know oneself, therefore, is it to be wise?" "It is," he said. "This, therefore, as it seems, is what the inscription which is in Delphi site of the Oracle of Apollo commands: to cultivate prudence, namely, and justice." "It appears so." "Do we know by this same thing how to control [others] rightly?" He nodded. "Therefore, that by which we know how to control rightly is certainly justice. But that by which we can discern both ourselves and others is prudence?" "It seems so." "Is justice and prudence, therefore, the same?" "It appears so." "And furthermore, states are then best governed when the unjust pay the penalty." "You speak the truth." "And this is the civil science." "It is," he said. "What indeed, whenever one man rightly institutes a state, what name will fit him, is it not tyrant and king?" He nodded. "Does he govern by the tyrannical or kingly art?" "Indeed." "These faculties, therefore, are the same as the previous ones?" "It seems so." "What indeed when one man rightly disposes of a house, what name best fits this one? Is it not manager and master?" "It fits." "Does this one also rule the family well by justice, or by another faculty?" "By justice." "Therefore, it is the same, as it appears: king, tyrant, civil [ruler], manager, master, prudent, just: and there is one art, kingly, tyrannical, civil, lordly, managerial, justice, and prudence."