P L A T O N I S

"It seems so." "What, therefore, is it for a philosopher, whenever a doctor has said something about the sick, not to be able to follow the words of that man, or to bring something to this, as any other of the artisans? And when a judge, or some other person of those whom we recounted a little earlier [speaks], is it not absurd [for him] in these matters, neither to follow the words nor to be able to confer anything?" "Why would it not be absurd, O Socrates, in such great matters, to have nothing that you might advise?" "Therefore," I asked, "do we say that it behooves the philosopher to be like a pentathlus pentathlete regarding these things, and holding second place to be useless, as long as any of those [artisans] is present? Or rather, that he himself ought not to offer his own house to be administered by any [other], nor hold second place in this, but to judge all things from himself, rightly judging, if indeed he rightly administers his own family?" He agreed with me. And I added, "Then if either some friend entrusts to him the account of his life, or a state entrusts something to be discerned or judged, is it shameful, O friend, for him to hold second place in these, or third, and not rather to exist as a leader?" "So it seems to me," he said. "Far be it, therefore, O excellent man, that to philosophize should be to learn many things and to treat the arts." When I had spoken thus, that wise man, affected by shame from the aforementioned [arguments], was silent. But the unlearned man affirmed that it was so, and all the others praised what was said.

The page concludes with the printer's mark: Printed by Guilelmus Morelius, Paris, in the year 1550, on the first of July.