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ERASTAE
and justice as well as prudence. "It seems so." What, therefore, is it for a philosopher, whenever a doctor has said anything regarding the sick, not to be able to grasp his words, or to contribute anything to the matter, just as any other craftsman would? And when a judge, or any other of those persons whom we mentioned a little earlier speaks, is it not absurd for him in these matters neither to grasp the words nor to be able to contribute anything? "Why would it not be absurd, O Socrates, to have no counsel to offer in such significant matters?" I asked, therefore, if we say that it behooves the philosopher to be like a pentathlus a five-event athlete, here used as a metaphor for one who does many things poorly in these areas, and that holding second place is useless so long as one of those craftsmen is present? Or rather, should he not offer his own house to be managed by another, nor hold second place in this, but instead regulate everything by his own judgment, if indeed he manages his own family correctly? He agreed with me. And I added, "Then if either a friend entrusts to him the account of his life, or a state entrusts something to be discerned or judged, is it not shameful, O friend, for him to hold second place in these things, or third, instead of acting as a leader?" "So it seems to me," he said. "Far be it, therefore, O excellent man, that to philosophize should mean to learn many things and to practice the arts." When I had spoken thus, that wise man, feeling ashamed because of the aforementioned arguments, remained silent. But the unlearned man affirmed that it was so, and all the others praised what was said.