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Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni Francesco · 1507

Motion
Furthermore, the rational love of the soul, of which we shall mostly speak in these books (omitting others), holds the first place among its other motions (for thus both Aristotle and our theologians use the word "motion"). It is presupposed as the root and seedbed from which others flow. For we would never desire anything unless we were provoked by love, because we desire a loved good, and we rejoice and exult with gladness, either having already obtained it or hoping to. Moreover, we neither grieve nor are saddened unless we either lose that which we have acquired, or when hope fails us in the pursuit of it.
To seek the supreme good in spirit
The soul itself, which understands and loves itself, when it begins to consider its own nature, immediately perceives through the innate power of the intellect that it is not the supreme good. Indeed, it is darkened by much ignorance and oppressed by many calamities. Hence it happens that, by the force of the will, which is always demanding the good, it is thirsty and impatient of delay, being transferred to seeking the supreme good—that good, I say, which those ancient wise men, with Aristotle as their authority, defined as being desired before all other things; and which, as the divine Dionysius teaches, turns all things toward the love of itself. For a certain spark and portion (if I may use the word) of divinity is left in all things in their very creation and origin, by which it seeks Him as the One from whose benevolent generosity they have flowed, and follows Him as effects follow their cause, namely, by loving and imitating Him according to the capacity of its nature. However, in the very investigation of the desired supreme good, many things offer themselves to the soul to be loved—both those that possess some good, and those that are loved because of a certain similarity and participation in that same nature. For it perceives that they are derived from the same principle and tend toward the same end. Since these are endowed with different perfections according to different grades of nature, they are loved by the soul, provided its affections are not distorted, in the same proportion and with the same tenor. Yet, in these, it does not stop at the grade, nor does it linger on the footprint, Sign because it entirely subordinates them in order to gain God as the supreme good, whom it loves and esteems above itself.