Solemn Dissertation on the Philosophy of Silence

...as the Holy Scriptures record of Zechariah, Luke I. v. 20; of Peter Chrysologus in his sermon XXXVI, which he had instituted concerning the woman with the issue of blood, becoming mute, as he testifies of himself in the cited place. It will be evident to those comparing the histories of legal experts that Angelo Poliziano remained silent when asked by the legal expert Bartholomaeus Socinus, who was his heir? I pass over other things myself, since the silence is voluntary, which is most highly recommended to philosophers for whom modesty is a care and a concern.

And voluntary silence, since it pertains to those things which, when viewed in themselves, are middle or indifferent; and therefore it can become now good, now evil by its use. For the precept which treats of bringing forth speech is affirmative, and it does not oblige unless a given occasion for speaking exists. Where, therefore, this is lacking, there is an obligation for silence. Cf. §. I. Nor does every narration of truth deserve praise, when the listener lacks the right to perceive the truth; but only that which tends toward private, as well as public, utility. Otherwise, it will be mere garrulity, which cannot but be harmful to the speaker. See Pufendorf On the Law of Nature and Nations, Book IV, chap. I, §. VII. and Heinrich Uffelmann in the Treatise on the law by which one human is bound to another in speech, chaps. III. & IV. The philosophy, however, which is intent on silence seems to have looked to both: approving the good; rejecting the evil silence; but in the present, I am going to have greater regard for that which philosophers use correctly, and that is permitted by the superior.

Therefore, that silence is laudable in philosophy which I have called good §. III. For it guards secrets, preserves given faith, conciliates friendship, nourishes patience, and protects from