Solemn Dissertation on the Philosophy of Silence

§. XI.

Specifically, Logic completes that part of this philosophy which prescribes silence and applies it to the rules of prudence. For nothing is more familiar to mortals than that they should commit precipitancy in judging. They pass their sentence on matters before they have correctly perceived their nature and circumstances. Hence, they fall into various and most grave errors, so that they regret having spoken. Such a precipitate judgment was brought forth by Alexander the Great in Curtius, Book IV, chap. XI, n. 22: Neither can the world be ruled by two suns, nor can there be two supreme kingdoms while the state of the earth is safe. He answered the envoy of Darius, although he should have first ensured that the same indefatigable and stable ease which the sun alone has to illuminate and warm the world should also be in themselves, so that they could care for all parts of their empire with equal speed and efficacy. Because human nature does not encompass this, it is most easy to understand that such a monarchy cannot exist, nor, if it exists, can it endure. See Freinshemius on the cited place of Curtius.

§. XII.

Since indeed precipitancy is born from the neglect of circumstances and is always joined with a contempt for necessary attention, deliberation, and proof, silence seems to be required until, with the help of these supports, judgment has matured. Especially let the cultivators of the liberal arts weigh these things with a mindful heart, because they have often been a stumbling block to themselves and others through precipitancy. Wherefore, let them take care not to judge without experience, nor to experience without judgment, nor to render the powers of their own intellect captive to the blind guidance of another, nor finally to wish to yield to anyone out of impudence. Let them rather enter into such a method of silence with Xenocrates, which Diogenes Laertius reports in the Life of Xenocrates:

He assigned one hour to silence.