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Schneider, Johann Friedemann, 1669-1733; Haccius, Johann Anton · 1717

DE PHILOSOPHIA SILENTII.
In moral philosophy, no less regard must be had for silence than in rational philosophy, whether this calls the will away from evil or directs and leads it back to good. Indeed, there are evils that are better handled by keeping silent than by speaking. Therefore, no prudent man will deny that one must deal with them more sparingly and cautiously than with good things. For if it were done otherwise, the appearance of evils would be presented to a person no more than if that imprudent doctor had offered advice on avoiding them. Therefore, the voice of the Emperors Constantius and Constans was worthy of their majesty, which they inserted regarding the most foul crime of luxury sexual vice/debauchery by treating it sparingly, L. 31. C. on the Julian Law concerning adultery: "that it is a crime there which it does not profit to know." It is considered far more detestable among mortals than it can be uttered with a chaste mouth. The Germans, mindful of this and of what is appropriate for the chastity of their own people, called such things stumme Sünden dumb/silent sins, which it is better to pass over in silence than to blab about. And I ask, in what matter did Niccolò Machiavelli err and fail more in his book The Prince De Principe than in that he described what needed to be done for an evil Prince? For he who describes the vices of others and places them before the eyes in living colors is not far from teaching them. From this it can be sufficiently done for those who require a broader declaration of evils, according to the common rule: "of the unknown, there is no hatred or flight." To whom I bring into notice what has just been said, and above all, that it suffices for the flight from evil to have indicated the kind of offense, not to have demonstrated the manner of offending, because of the danger of imitating the crime. Therefore, for the flight from evil, not an accurate and distinct, but a general, even confused, knowledge is useful. I shall be silent about the fact that the will does not always follow, but sometimes precedes the intellect, as I said above concerning the tongue preceding the mind in §. XII, about which, however, there will be a place to speak elsewhere.