Commentary on the First and Second Chapters of the Thirtieth Book of the Natural History of Gaius Plinius Secundus

Here we first ask the noble readers to take in good part if we have reported anything less carefully concerning the ceremonies of the Magi, for we have determined to treat nothing of the doctrine of nefarious magic except to destroy the foolish opinions of impious men; for we believe they should be punished, expelled from the city and the fatherland, and burned. We shall therefore treat first of that magic which we said is an active portion of natural science; then of the nature of demons and the kinds of magic. However, it must be weighed first who are called the Rings of Plato and what the Chain of Homer is. There are, without doubt, rings in Plato and a Homeric Chain, which are nothing other than the order and series of things serving Divine Providence: a series, I say, of divine powers, partly invisible and partly visible, and the hidden lights are certainly angelic and rational, but the manifest are celestial lights. There is a mutual and indeed wonderful connection between these, which we would rightly call a chain; but it will be called intellectual, golden, and of providence; however, this one is natural, silver, and fatal, entirely subject to providence, by the power of which a purer soul can be sequestered (as some wish) from Fate, which seems to have been noted by the Platonists, and does not displease the gravity of magic; for this is sanctioned by the Astronomy of the Hebrews. For it must be weighed here more attentively and examiningly that there are three cognitive powers in our soul (as I see it is the opinion of many philosophers): Mind, Thought, and Opinion. Again, while the soul makes itself a rival to nature, three things have been devised by it: Science, Art, and Experience, which are analogous to the three powers: Mind to Science; the power of Thought to Art; Opinion to Experience. For just as Opinion offers itself without reason, so too does Experience hold less of the reasons of the things subject to it. For from these it follows primarily that magic is a certain thing, which is (as we have taught) an active portion of natural science, and that it teaches nothing other than, by the aid of natural virtues, to perform—