This library is built in the open.
If you spot an error, have a suggestion, or just want to say hello — we’d love to hear from you.

embrace, can be proven in two ways. It is established that, just as there are two primary wellsprings of obligatory acts—namely, the Intellectus understanding of the matter and all circumstances almost occurring around it, and the Voluntas will to act and bind oneself, which two are distinguished by the style of Paulus in L. 48. and of Celsus in L. 159. ff. de R. J. Digest on rules of law as Animi judicium judgment of the mind—so perhaps no one will deny that the said principles of obligations apply to a ward, such as one past infancy. Truth itself confirms that wherever the cause is present, the effect follows. However, every express declaration of the mind regarding transferring a right to another is sufficient so that the promisor is validly obligated, just as Grotius teaches excellently in L. 2. Cap. 11. tr. de J. B. & P. Book 2, Chapter 11, treatise on the Law of War and Peace. That Lord Lauterbach believes Consensum consent is not sufficient, but that besides this, Potestas power, and others, such as Ungepaur in Exerc. X. qu. 3., require æquitatem equity, is indeed true; but it is not conceded that power and equity are absent in a case where a ward has manifestly declared his consent.
And this is why the ward is naturally bound