De cometis

good things, the principles are virtues and spirits, according to the property of which sensitive knowledge is necessarily configured. But the judgment of sense follows sensitive knowledges, to which follows the acceptance or refutation of the sensitive appetite, according to the presentation of the object. Such impulses, however, are fortified in sensuality according to the fortitude of the making spirit and the disposition of the apprehending one, much intended, because they draw to themselves the judgment of reason entirely because of the likeness of the knowledges of the intellect to the impulses of sensuality, since our intellection depends on things sensed as Aristotle says. The will, however, howsoever free it may be, will not be able to accept unless it judges it good, nor refute unless it judges it bad through reason. Therefore, the will will conform itself to the sensitive appetite, because reason also did the same in conforming itself to the judgment of the sense. For these impulses, by the continuous presence of themselves, become of such fortitude that they so commend an object to the intellect and reason that it is not well possible to understand and judge otherwise than according to the property of the efficient spirits and the judgment of the sense. It is clear, therefore, from what is said, that in coming times in which great applications of the virtue of the stars are made, the sign of which appears in the air, great alterations of the air and of other elements follow, according to which, by consequence, the spirits of the heart in men and animals will be altered. And knowledges, estimations, affections, thoughts, delights, and judgments will be similar to the nature of the producing star, which it is difficult to resist, even for the prudent. And for the cause of wars and many things, the generation of merely superfluous bile does not seem to suffice, as some have determined. For such exuberance in the body leads it outside the latitude of health and effects sicknesses proportionate to itself. And although the mind also is changed at its presence, yet the reason for all other diversities in knowledges and affections and manners could not be rendered from bile alone. And only the choleric also would be more apt for such things, the contrary of which experience has taught most of all.

How new laws and customs arise from new inclinations and manners and old ones are abrogated

And in these impulses mentioned, the choice of the will proceeds by a double way. One way, the will follows the regulated judgment of reason, and a senate or a prudent man will strive, indeed, to order that in such impulses the community of the common people be strengthened if the object of them be good, or will strive to obstruct the said insults and impulses if the object of them be bad. It will be necessary, therefore, to establish laws because of human necessity and its evident utility, and sometimes to abrogate some privileges and laws, since the Civil Law says: "In establishing new things, there ought to be evident utility so that one may recede from that law which for so long seemed equitable." By this one way, a portion of law is established, which, namely, necessity establishes. The second way, the will follows such impulses. When regulated reason is suppressed, then men will think of ways and manners by which they may obtain what is desired and attain delights and find ingenuities of defending themselves in these and preserving themselves. Then, from necessity, certain new inclinations and manners arise, by which