[Vocabularius utriusque iuris]

continues from previous page: they signify personal but also real actions. Very broadly, when it also signifies the office of the judge, and in this way, the complaint in the office of the testament is called an action. Digest reference to the Pandects of Justinian, on the authority of the judge, Book 1, law "when a son in the power of the father". This makes for law "of the word action" in On the meaning of words, Digest, and On the lex Aquilia, reference to the law on property damage concerning actions and obligations. And this word "action" signifies well both the right and the fact, nor is it inconsistent.

¶ An action therefore signifies the office of the judge, the right of pursuing, although the office is a matter of fact. And there is a distinction placed between the right of a man and an office. For an action is the right of pursuing in judgment what is owed to oneself, Institutes reference to the legal manual of Justinian, On actions, in the beginning. And some add "that which is his or another's," so that that definition includes every action, both in rem against a thing and in personam against a person. But that aforementioned definition only includes the personal action. However, that which is yours is owed to you. If, however, what is not yours, whatever is in judgment must be included in diverse ways what is sought. And it is concluded in a real and personal action because in a personal one I seek what is owed to me; in a real action, I seek something as my own. Wherefore this word "action" is taken differently and in different ways, as has been promised. And note that this word "owed" is sometimes taken broadly, as when it is said, "whatever is owed to you in judgment," i.e., the thing that you seek as your own thing, without the vindication of the thing by the action of loan or deposit according to Azo 12th-century Italian jurist, in his Summa, title On the edict, around the beginning. Formerly, an action was said to be a formula formed by the magistrates, law 2, paragraph "Concerning the origin of law," Digest On the origin of law, whence the common formula was said, Digest On theft, law "If a slave a ship". Today, however, it is done without the imperation or the reception of solemn words, Code Codex Justinianus, On formulas and actions abolished, throughout. Nor today is there any difference between interdicts and actions, since an interdict is nothing other than a private action. An action is therefore said to be the civil right or the private [right] by which I can demand what is owed from you or seek that the thing be restored to me, according to Azo and Goffredus Goffredus de Trano, canonist, above in the title On the loved ones. And an action is from civil law, Institutes On natural, general, and civil law, section "But the law". And according to the canons, an action is called a case, chapter Forzo, On the meaning of words. And according to the laws, an action must be placed in a case because no one acts without an action, Digest On the business of another, If a ward in ...

himate possibly: "exanimate" or "exhimate" - unclear in source, on the law, yet they allow too subtle repetitions of actions as in chapter Dilecti, On judgments.

¶ Of actions, some are in rem concerning the thing and some are in personam concerning the person. An action in rem is called the vindication of a thing, when, namely, someone says the thing about which the action is brought is his. And the accuser says it to be his. Therefore, when you seek some thing as your own by the vindication of the thing, then you act by an action in rem. By an action in personam, however, you seek from an adversary that something be given or done for you. Also, some actions are called of good faith, some of strict law. Actions of good faith are not called so because good faith must be preserved in them, because good faith is also preserved in actions of strict law. But they are called good faith because good faith must greatly abound between the contracting parties in them. And also all accessories come into them, and those things about which nothing was thought, as in the action of purchase or the contract of sale. Also, that which is not expressly done comes into it, namely the time of delay; he who does not restore to another that to which he is bound by the nature of the contract, damages and interests come into being which ought to be restored, and thus in them the office of the judge abounds much more than in an action of strict law. There are, however, seventeen actions of good faith, which are enumerated in the Institutes, On actions, paragraph "Of actions", and placed in the gloss, On exceptions, chapter Venerabilis, and they are contained in these verses: Purchase, hire, mandate, and deposit. Pledges, the same, of partners. Morals and heirs, tutelage, things committed, things managed. With prescribed words, with estimation and exchange. These are of good faith; the rest are of strict law. Others are called actions of strict law, such as an action from loan, from stipulation, from arbitration, and the like. And in these, the accessory does not come, nor those things about which no thought was had, as noted by Bernardus Bernardus de Botone, author of the Glossa Ordinaria to the Decretals in the gloss, passim. Nor do damages and interests, which are said to be restored, come into these from the time of delay when one has not returned to another that to which he is bound by the nature of the contract. Also, of real actions, some work for corporeal things, and thus the vindication of a thing has its place; others for principal things and for servitudes to be acquired, served, and defended, and thus they include two actions, of which one is called