[De veritate dicenda aut tacenda]

he ought to act, not according to his own knowledge which he received not from the law but from a man. Secondly, a witness runs in a judgment, legitimately cited, and his testimony is required by his superior who ought and could cite him and command him to bear witness, just as to him to whom he is bound to obey, just as in those matters that pertain to justice. That witness, therefore, in giving testimony, can behave in two ways, or testimony can be inquired of him in two ways. First, in those matters in which a reputation has preceded and which are manifest, and in these there is no doubt that he is bound to bear witness and to pronounce the truth which he knows as such, especially if it is not a matter of crimes or to the punishment of a private person alone, or the utility of the commonwealth, which is to be preferred to a private person. For indeed, the harm and punishment of any single man is to be postponed to the harm of the commonwealth by the order of charity. If, however, testimony is required from him by his superior regarding those things which he knows secretly, and about which infamy has not preceded, and not regarding manifest things, he is not bound to obey the superior, nor ought he, nor is he bound to, pronounce the truth which he knows secretly. The reason for this is that this is against divine law, to which no private law or command of any superior should or can be prejudicial. For it is said in Matthew 18: "If your brother has sinned against you, argue him between you and him alone," etc. "Against you," I say—that is, with you alone knowing. Since, therefore, fraternal admonition in secret has not preceded, such a brother would act against divine law who would thus obey a superior who cannot command this, but is saying to him: "It is necessary to obey God rather than men." If, however, in judgment or outside, his testimony is not required by a superior,