[Dicta de arbore quae dicitur Imago hominis]

For it itself is the repository of the intentions and forms apprehended by these potencies. It itself renders a new act of imagination or fantasy about a thing already long observed. Whence it is defined: Memory is the repository of past things. For it rightly preserves in itself all the figures once presented by the senses, along with their intentions, from the inspection of which the act of the soul is fulfilled, namely when it has recalled the act of the forms of bodies; that is what is the act of imagination. But when it has reduced the intentions of the forms, it will be the act of the estimative virtue. But all these acts can be said to be of thought. A follower of this is reminiscence, which is a semi-living memory; for it is living on one side and crucified by oblivion on the other. It cannot exist without reason. For it summons the part of memory with the collation of place, cause, or person and many other circumstances, and brings to act what was lost through oblivion. Whence it is defined: Reminiscence is the beginning of many things. It was a work of great necessity that memory be given to man by the fountain of goodness, so that oblivion might not wipe away the forms of creatures from us, so that man might provide for himself in the future by the recognition of past things, and so that it itself might administer to us the material for thinking about both the creator and the creature. Reminiscence was given to the rational soul by divine providence alone, so that it might lead things omitted and missed, which were cut away by oblivion, with the circumstances of the place and person, before the eyes of the mercy of God by tears of penitence to pure confession, and so that it might sigh to be restored to the perfection of perfection which it had in the state of innocence.

Concerning the Seventh Image.

With these potencies the rational soul is naturally endowed, namely the concupiscible and the irascible, because from them every affection arises. But the movement of them is caused by lower and higher potencies. Where, for example, when the common sense or the imaginative or the estimative virtue apprehends a desirable object, for the obtaining of this, the concupiscible power