[Dicta de arbore quae dicitur Imago hominis]

present them to the notice of intelligence. Whence it is defined: Reason is the habit of the mind by which the mind knows the truth. Thus reason is the appetite of the soul by which it contemplates through itself, not through the body. Also Seneca: "Reason is the arbiter of goods and evils." Also someone says: Reason is the discretive force of good and evil, of the licit and illicit, of the honest and dishonest, with the choice of good and flight of evil. For reason is said to be like the imitation of nature. For it follows nature as its governor. For it intends the affections and does not cease to compare them from their error. And note that reason is divided into higher and lower. For higher reason intends things above or eternal. Lower reason, however, provides for the dispensation of temporal things, as for the republic or for political virtues. Whence in the second book of the Sentences: Therefore, it is shown to us inwardly by certain degrees of consideration through the parts of the soul, where something begins to occur that is not common to us with the beasts; there reason begins, where man is already asked to be known as better. But what is found in the soul common with the beasts pertains to sensuality. And note that wisdom is ascribed to higher reason, but science to lower. Also it is written: If you wish to conquer the whole world, subject yourself to reason. For by reason, adolescence must be conquered. Whence well: When applied, reason discerns what is best; when neglected, the mind is implicated in errors. Concerning reason, Augustine says: This is, he says, the image in which men are created, because they rule over other animals; which, when it exceeds created things by the most excellent creator, justifies it to the face; the form is changed into form. For if life and justice help reason, founded in good will, it is raised upward, with all things obeying the spirit. But if the delight of temporal things entices it, it is blinded from the light of truth; it chooses death for life, and it judges the pestiferous allurements of sensuality to be good by its own madness. And thus blinded reason is enticed by the allurements of the concupiscence of sensuality. Reason was given to the soul so that it might rejoice in differing from all living things and might choose good when evil is placed before it, and so that it might bring other potencies to the norm of virtues in obedience.