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Savageti, Johannes · 1476

They also said that the Pope did not observe the order of law, and in this they allege their own ignorance. Because the Pope, in those things which are treated before him in consistory and in businesses belonging to him, is not bound to observe the process and order of law, as noted by Johannes Andreae (De consuetudine, chapter cum inter, on the word "irritandum"). Nor does anything else they say avail, namely that the Pope acted iniquitously, because since the consistory of God and the Pope is the same in judging and absolving, whatever he does avails, the keys not erring, according to Hostiensis, as noted (De translatione, chapter quanto, on the word "vicem" and there by Johannes Andreae). Therefore he says his judgment proceeds from the face of God. Therefore, just as God judges no one unjustly, so it must be judged of the Pope. Therefore, what the Pope approves, it is not permitted to reprobate (35, q. 9; 24, q. 1, "this is the faith"). And if the Pope does something that seems unjust where we cannot assign a reason, it is nonetheless just, as noted by the gloss (chapter cum supra, 23, q. 4). The chapter in causis (De re iudicata) does not stand in the way, where it is said that in causes which are divided by the judgment of the Supreme Pontiff, both the order of law and the vigor of equity are to be observed; for this has place when one proceeds in the form of a judgment between a plaintiff and an opponent, but when confirmation is sought with no one opposing, as was the case of the said pretended election, because while its confirmation was sought, no one opposed, nor was Lord Ludwig himself called, therefore neither a formal petition nor a contestation of the suit was necessary, as noted by Speculator (De libelli conceptione). Also, because the pretended election itself was notoriously null, attempted against the decree and inhibition of the Pope (said chapter si eo tempore, De electionibus, Book VI), which decree indeed affected even the ignorant, as appears there and in the chapter quia cunctis (De concessione prebendarum) and (De prebendis, chapter dudum and chapter quod, Book VI). Therefore, there was no need to observe any order of law regarding its cassation, because in notorious matters, not to observe the order of law is to observe the order of law. The Rota noted (Inquisition, decision 335), which begins "It was doubted whether, when one acts concerning the nullity of a sentence," determining that when it is clearly established about the nullity of a sentence from the same acts of the cause, the judge ought to revoke it without other solemnity and observation of terms. Therefore, it is not expedient to determine here when one acts concerning confirmation, whether it is judicial or extra-judicial (about which in the final chapter, De electionibus, Book VI). And not only was the said pretended election null because it was attempted against the decree and inhibition of the Pope, but their election also did not avail because at the time of the pretended election the church was not vacant, because as I said above in the first doubt, while Ludwig lived, Herrman was bishop, although he did not have episcopal exercise; yet immediately after the death of Herrman, he had the exercise in temporal and spiritual matters, because his provision had met with effect and drew back to the time of the date.