[Iustiniani Institutiones]

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a those two words, "constant and perpetual," remove from there. Because a good man does not possess everything, since it is said that the just man falls seven times a day. And therefore he never remains in the same state, as in Digest, on those who are not in their own right, § as [they] act. Likewise, what is said in the fragment, "to attribute his own right to each one," I understand this as regarding affections, because regarding the act he cannot. Which is to say, possessing the good affection of attributing, just as in the present case § on Augustus. And just as regarding marriage, which is indivisible, as in Digest, on the marriage power, in the beginning, although sometimes it is divided, as previously; Code, on repudation, law, by consent. Or, a definition is brought forth as in the summary of this title: "constant and perpetual will." This is the good habit of the mind, as Rullius defines it. Justice is a habit of the soul, observing common utility, attributing to each his own dignity, according to Plato. Justice is a virtue which possesses excellence in those who possess the least. Or, as I believe, justice is a disposition of the soul, correctly judging in individual things, "attributing" so that one may live honestly for oneself, and thus not harm another, and first, may benefit. Law: "his own right," in goods, merit. b Knowledge can be correctly read as "that dictation, science" in the ablative case, or the opposite, if it is not of the ancient case, and although the dictation "knowledge" is in the ablative case.

thus, J. t. i. in the beginning § "never." Thus, according to this, it is necessary that whatever the prudent [jurist] wishes, he should be ⸿ to read theology. R. Not in the body of law, but all things are found there, as in Code, on fugitives, law 3; law 4; and Code, on the sacred church, and on bishops and clergy, and on many others, where it specifically treats of divine things. Likewise, what is the difference between justice, and law, and jurisprudence? R. Justice is a virtue; law is the executive [power] of that virtue; jurisprudence is the knowledge of that law. Likewise, justice is the best median good; jurisprudence is the lowest. Likewise, justice wishes to attribute to each one his own right; law, however, assists; jurisprudence teaches what those rights are, so that it may be taught what is to be done with them. d "Knowledge," i.e., placed in common of justice, of law, and of jurisprudence. e And "to those beginning," dative; they can be read with the word "J." [i.e., Institutiones], appearing as ablative, so that it might refer to the first book in the preface, justice. f "To us," the compilers of this [work] are speaking, which is explained by them. g "Handed down," namely, the laws of the Roman people. h "Light," regarding the words. i "Simple," regarding the meaning. k "Most diligent," regarding the subtle words. l "And most exact," regarding the subtle material and meaning. m "Interpretation," i.e., easy meaning. n "Which," namely, the difference. o "Turns away," not against the importunity, as in Digest, on the petition, in the cause, in the beginning. Whence Solomon: "Three things are unknown to me, and the fourth which I ignore: the way of a serpent upon a rock, the way of a bird flying in the air, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, which is the most difficult of all; the way of a young man in his adolescence." Whence Daniel in the mind. Rest, heart, in facilities, as below, on those who are liberated, and different § it is to be known. Accur[sius]. p "Mature," i.e., not childish, which goes plainly, goes sanely. q "Precepts of law," i.e., precepts of law. Precepts of law command something that pertains to one of these three: for not all law commands, rather some punishes, some forbids, some permits, as in Digest, on the laws of the senate, law: "the law." Some counsels, as in Digest, on the vindication of things, law: "he who." Some bestows, as in Code, on transactions, "act."

A woodcut depicts the figure of Justice, holding a sword in one hand and scales in the other, symbolizing the balance of law and the administration of equity.

attributing. Jurisprudence the knowledge of divine and human things, the science of the just and the unjust. These things having been generally recognized, those beginning, we will expose the laws of the Roman people; they seem to be able to be handed down most conveniently in this way: if first, by a light and simple way, then afterwards, by the most diligent and most exact interpretation, individual matters are handed down. Otherwise, if at the beginning we should burden the still raw and infirm mind of the student with a multitude and variety of things, we will accomplish one of two things: either we will make the student a hater of studies, or with great labor on his part, if through him the diffidence which

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r "Honestly," with regard to oneself, as honesty and honorable marriage is, as in Digest, on the rite of nuptials, law 1; and regarding morals, as in Digest, on tutors and curators, from these, law: "it is necessary to know," § penult. Accur[sius]. florent[ine].
s "Another," whence that which you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, as in the Decretals in the beginning.
s "His own right," so that he does not harm, so that he does not hurt, so that he also assists; for it is not enough to abstain from evil, if that which is good is not done, as argued in the Decretals, 86 distinction, chapter: "not to do," § without. Although the words are taken here just as above in the definition of justice, in the end, it is answered: it does not first comprehend these three, but rather those are only what is two, for the third is omitted. Or not, which is in this reprobate opinion, or of others which directly [state] that in this title it was not defining law, which is the "art of the good and equitable," whose merit, we are called "priests." For I say that these words which are here provide just as much, for what is said here, "precepts of law," by this is meant "art," since art is a collection of precepts. Likewise, by this which is said, "to live honestly, not to harm another," [it] is worth just as much

most young men turn away, we will lead them later to that to which, having been led by a lighter way, they could have been brought more maturely without great labor on their part and without any diffidence. The precepts of law are these: to live honestly, not to harm another, to attribute to each his own right. Of this study, there are two positions: public and private. Public law is that which pertains to the status of the Roman commonwealth. Private is that which pertains to the utility of individuals. Therefore, we must speak of private law, which is tripartitely collected. For it is from natural precepts, or of nations, or civil.

as "of the good and equitable." Likewise, by this which is said, "to attribute his own right to each one," I gather, by whose merit we are called "priests," i.e., administering sacred laws to each one, as here, and Digest, on the same, law 1, in the beginning.
v "Of this study," that is, of the art to be obtained through study.
t "There are two positions," i.e., species, according to P[lacius]. Above, here, i.e., above on two kinds, not species. It is placed although art is separated by study, nor does it please him that because of the multitude of things, many things are said, and therefore it would be said that what follows is what was inquired about above. Another is assumed, and so on of individuals. But I believe that this was not the understanding of the one who is in the Roman matter, i.e., it rests in the priests and the magisterial [offices] of my teachers, as in Digest, on the same, law 1, § public. But rather, as law 1, in the beginning, and others, § "but what," column 5, and Code, on fugitives, law 3, and final, chapter "immediately clear," and Digest, on the same.
x "Pertains," i.e., principally, for it is said in the law, law 2, § "after the origin" and of the individual is the utility of the commonwealth observed. Accur[sius].
y "Pertains," i.e., principally; secondarily, however, it pertains to private utility, for it is expedient for the republic, as below, on those who are of their own or another's right, § penult.
z "Private," § which [is] of public, it is answered: it will be said in the fourth book, Digest, on the treasury, and Code, on the same, and in other following titles, and through almost all three books of the code where [it speaks] of public law, the church. And is it tripartitely collected? Answer: not as I will immediately say, and from those precepts. Since, therefore, those are examples of public and private, why does it speak only of private that it is "tripartitely collected"? Answer: because he was about to speak of that private [law]. Likewise, because he had made this book, he did not want to burden them much, which he would have done if he had treated of public law in this book.
ʒ "Tripartite," for in private law, as in its entirety, it was tripartite: natural precepts, as for example with another's [property] to become enriched by another's damage, as in Digest, on the same, "for nature." Likewise, of nations, as when someone, for the protection of his own body, has done that which he has done to be expected, as in Digest, on the same, law 1, verse: "and," and 2, Digest.