[Liber sextus Decretalium]

on this point. Say that the aforementioned laws are not contrary. For those speak concerning rescripts given against the law, which are not valid unless mention is made in them of the law, and [this is] especially when an error of fact falls there, as in the chapter "Nonnulli." But [the present case] speaks concerning the second law, which takes away the first [if it is] directly contrary, even if it does not make mention of it. And there could be a reason: because the promulgation of a law is more mature and deliberate than the granting of a favor. Ad hoc: See in the preamble of this book at the end. In the same place, also let us say that if it stood with the certain knowledge of the prince, the entire law elicited would be valid, as is noted in the contraries. But at first sight, it is presumed to be obtained for [the sake of] opportunity, whence the second justification is wont to be expressed, in [the] Authentica, "That no judge," paragraph "This indeed we order," and the Authentica "On judges," paragraph "All however." And if the Roman Pontiff grants something against

the law, now it changes the name of the Roman Pontiff, and it must be said [to be] a privilege. In distinction, "Privileges." See "On Roman signatures," [in the chapter] "Abbate." Also [it is] against [the previous point] because one must stand by ancient law, 33, question 6, paragraph "In opinione," and law [in] distinction, "Domino sancto," in the end. Say as there in the penultimate gloss. a Because, diversity of reason removes sometimes the constitution of the prince from the merit, because the promulgation of that law would otherwise be superfluous and useless, if it were otherwise in individuals, because although the law may not have place in the whole, it will have place in Mutina, Padua, and other places. b Reason. c Fact. For it does not revoke [it] c Since they are a matter of fact, and I think that by this letter the question is cleared which asks whether a new constitution abolishes a statute of a bishop contrary [to it], by which only the common law was cautioned. Place [this] in the terms of the decretal "On age and quality," later, which regarding the presentation of benefices is today revoked by the decree "On institutions," 1. Is the statute of the bishop also removed, by which that was simply cautioned which the aforementioned decree says? The same example can be placed: on decrees, see "On dioceses," [in the chapter] "Probatum," approaching the decree of the same title, chapter 2, and "On censuses," [the chapter] "Romana," and chapter "Exigit." To the decree of the same title, "Felice." I say, however, that here the common law is removed, and likewise a statute which simply contained the common law, since that is not a matter of fact and does not consist in fact; rather it is a matter of law, which consists in law, and [it] makes that which is not [done?]. [According to] Innocent and Host [Hostiensis] and the moderns. See, but the Roman Pontiff, chapter 1, where [it is] noted that concerning a rescript or privilege which simply contains common law, in the second privilege or rescript it is not necessary that mention be made. And if we say the contrary, now bishops could take away the power of the Supreme Pontiff to remove laws in their dioceses immediately, issuing [statutes] simply which are cautioned by law. Also, for this there is a most evident reason. This decree equates these two: customs and singular statutes. Which would now follow that the correction or change of all laws would be useless. For he says that although the common law has been revoked, nevertheless the prescribed custom which observed the common law has not been revoked. For the same reason that we say this about a statute, and that would be absurd. Also, we cannot say that statutes containing the common law are of singular persons, which this decree requires. Also, if the Pope removes his [own] constitution, which is more, [he does so] much more strongly [by removing] the constitution of an inferior saying the same, which is less. To this, it works optimally "On faith of instruments," [the chapter] "Pastorale," where it is noted that if a decree [as a] "vagus" [wandering/extra-decretal] sounds [against] the common law, it ought to be judged according to it, because it is law. The same I say in a local statute, that if it contains common law, with the law removed, the statute which is common law is removed. If, therefore, custom and statute are singular and consist in fact, and are reasonable, and are not expressly revoked, they are not derogated by a constitution newly issued.

Otherwise, it is otherwise. This says the decretal. Jo. An. [Johannes Andreae].
e To be ignorant. See, as [in] "On ecclesiastical benefices," as "Nostrum."
f Them. Namely, the customs and statutes.
h Reasonable. As [in] "Whether a custom is reasonable or not," it must be left to the judge, since no certain rule could be handed down, according to Hostiensis, who notes in the "Summa on Custom," paragraph "What is custom," [that] custom is a usage. And he says "reasonable" well, because this alone

is chosen to derogate in something. The same.
May perils be prevented by varying sentences, and we do not wish the statutes of any ordinaries to be bound by prelates, being ignorant, while however their ignorance was not gross or supine.

i Expressly. "On custom," chapter 1, and chapter "Cum," paragraph "Si elect," because often, and the chapter "Cum non deceat," in which even privileges and statutes are revoked. Paragraph "Cleri," "Non residentibus," chapter 1. See "On censures," paragraph "Quia," "On penance and remission," chapter 2, paragraph "Si," chapter 1. "On chapel matters," chapter 1, with the end, which all do not seem to be competent examples, since they were not reasonable, which is true, [though] it can be said today because the law resisted. Have examples, paragraph "On age and quality," as those who [are...]
k To derogate. Against f. [Digest] "On sepulcher violated," law 3, paragraph "Division," chapter 1. Clement [V], "Uxor." Solution: that law is understood in many ways, as there noted. And f. [Digest] "On laws," law "Concerning those which," but insofar as [is] said, it seems that a custom or statute preceding the law is removed by the law, saying this for this reason, when the prince intends this, as noted above. See [the] understanding of that law, see "On faith of instruments," [the chapter] "Pastorale," in the gloss, in the end, which solution is approved by this decree. But this opinion of Hostiensis is reproved, who had noted against this text in the "Summa on custom," paragraph "And on virtue."
l This decree was issued for the declaration of five special cases. See "On sentences of excommunication," "A nobis," 1, and its paragraph which is noted there. And of it, there were two dictums: the first, that statutes of ordinaries do not bind those probably ignorant, according to which a statute of a bishop does not bind subjects in the diocese.
m Souls. To the same, C. [Codex] "On [jurisdiction?]," [chapter] 1, and "On sepulchers," chapter 1.
n Sentences. Which bind souls so that the first reason might have place. I say the same in other sentences and [where] temporal punishments are inflicted. f. [Digest] "On decrees," [by the magistrate], law last, where you have that one who is ignorant is not bound by a municipal statute, but only one who is knowing. To this, C. [Codex] "On testaments," "Iubemus," in the end. And it can be said that in this, he provides for souls, at least because of the sin of disobedience, which is the greatest. 7, question 1, chapter "Sciendum," or concerning which he said, because concerning the others there was no doubt by the said law.
o Statutes. Concerning general statutes of canons or laws, he does not speak, which ought to be known and kept by all. See "On constitutions," chapter 1. Ordinaries, who are called ordinaries, note [the] gloss.
p Ordinaries. See "On the office of the ordinary," "Cum ab ecclesiarum."
q Ignorant. Against [the] note [by] the same, in the aforesaid decree "A nobis," and it was moved from the fact that he was falling into a fact already condemned, and because he was in fault by doing the prohibited thing, and because [of] why he had acted thus, see where fault precedes, fear does not excuse the case. f. [Digest] "On [actions?] from fear," "Si mulier."
r Supine. Which is to be ignorant of what all know. See "Postula," chapter 1. "On the clerk of the excommunicated," "Ex minori," etc. Ignorance: one of fact, another of law. If of law, either common or singular. For a statute of a bishop makes law among the subjects which, however, does not bind those probably ignorant, as here.
s Statute. Note, he does not say he can [make] statutes. To the same, see [the] above, "On major and obedience," "Si quis venerit," and a legate in his province. See "On legates," chapter last. And such statutes were perpetual even after death or recess, as there.
t Committed. Against, see "On sentences of excommunication," "Romana," paragraph "Caueant," where it is said that excommunication ought to be made for future crimes. Solution: [This refers to past crimes].