[Liber sextus Decretalium]

a Losses: See "On the sentence of excommunication," [chapter] "When for a cause."

b Appeal: See "On exceptions," [chapter] "When in," [chapter] "Signified," and [chapter] "The last."

c Obtained: And here the time of the date or of the obtaining is inspected, below, same [section], "Eam te," and below, same [section], "Tibi qui," "On prebends," [chapter] "To him whom," [etc.]. Such a letter which was acted upon before him is similarly void before the ordinary, [it is] to be judged, unless perhaps one who knew knowingly admitted him; [the same] was removed, because it was revoked by the chapter "Pia," as I said above, in the gloss [concerning] "Whether."

f In many religions: Below, "On testimonies," [chapter] "When the cause," and [chapter] "Signified," Digest "On testimonies," law 1, at the end. Item: in things left for the redemption of captives, below, "On religious houses," [chapter] 6, and below, same title, [chapter] 7. Item: fear restricts severity when a multitude has sinned, "On the cleric," [etc.], [chapter] "Carriers," [chapter] "These." Item: ...

a Losses. If a defendant procures letters against a plaintiff regarding personal suits to different [judges], it is not valid; nor is the process of them, and he will condemn the defendant in expenses. The same applies to a defendant who comes as a plaintiff, or a reconvening plaintiff, during the same trial. This is what it says.
b As I can. To the same [effect]. See the prologue of this [book], and the ius law suffices. See the prologue to the Ephesians, 47th distinction, chapter last.
c Expanding. It expands in that it determines the process is not valid. And it determines [this] regarding the defendant, for the law in the Decretals [states] that some were not from the prelates.
d Personal. It is otherwise in real property-related [suits]. 25th distinction, "Of the sort," Digest "On the praetor's edicts," and the reason for the diversity [is] that personal [suits] are of a different nature than real [ones], and are more easily expedited, for often an instrument or writing is made thereof. Argument: Digest "On the edict," law 1, "This legacy," and commonly these were personal questions, whereas those were great. Also, in one petition one can act for several personal suits, the cause of each having been assigned. Code "On annual exceptions," law 1, and many [others]. Below, "On libels," chapter 6, and following. The better reason is according to the moderns: why something else in personal, something else in real. Because the two days which were formerly given for the defendant, below, same [section], "Some," or one which is given today by the Decretals, 1st [book], statute, kept in its moderation, are counted from the borders of the diocese where the real thing is situated, which is to be acted upon, below, same [section], "Beloved," 2, note. If it happened that the defendant could not be convened for several real suits before the same judge because the things were remote from each other; [but] in these personal ones, they are counted from the borders of the diocese where he has a domicile. Whence, for all, it would be more convenient to appear before one judge. And therefore in these [there is] something else than in those. But perhaps that reason ceases today by the Decretals, 1st [book], statute. And speak as I said there in the gloss, "Formerly we were saying."
e And more easily. Because the plaintiff reconvenes; the cause ought to be terminated by one and the same sentence. If they convene, then the first can be terminated, and [then] the second. This is proved here, below, "On loans," petition, chapter 1. Below, "On the office of the delegate," [chapter] "When the beloved," or perhaps in either case it is to be terminated by one sentence. And this [must be done] while the trial is pending before the same judge. Once finished, before another, for then the defendant cannot act before the first delegate, since the jurisdiction regarding the investigation has been finished. Below, "On the office of the delegate," [chapter] "To the plaintiff." But whether he can reconvene the same [person] before the ordinary during the same trial is doubted. And it seems for the affirmative, since this letter says: he preferred to procure letters, whence it seems to speak only of the delegate. But because the same reason is in both, the same law seems to be, according to B [Johannes de Imola], or perhaps it is not the same reason, because ordinary jurisdiction is favorable, and extraordinary is hateful, and therefore something else could be said regarding the ordinary. To this makes what Innocent holds, below, chapter last.

Wishing to shorten the losses of litigation with as much industry as we can by the aid of equity, we expand the statute of the late Pope Gregory IX, published upon this matter, [and] we decree that those who wish to move personal questions beyond another must strive to procure letters, not to different judges, but to the same [one] regarding all such questions. But whoever shall do the contrary shall lack any benefit of the letters, nor shall the process held by the same be valid for the defendant.

f Upon all. But if the defendant has appealed upon one personal [matter], the judge will not be able to proceed in the other, [if the] first [is] not finished, since [it] is suspended [if] it is attached to them. Below, "On appeals," [chapter] "To this, if in one." But it is not more convenient to act under one than under different [judges], and thus this [statute] seems damaging to this plaintiff. But according to the things said by B, because the iniquity of the judge who proceeded wrongly does not make it so that the defendant can be dragged before another judge because of this, and he should blame himself who obtained such a judge. And he will condemn the actor in expenses until the cause of the appeal is finished, which, if it is pronounced just, the plaintiff may thereafter strive to procure another judge; otherwise, if it is unjust, he will proceed in the others. And the same seems [to apply] to other impediments when the matter is not whole.
g Questions. And thus, to the same and not to different [judges] must he procure letters, even with one trial finished, according to B. But some say the contrary, because this [statute] and that are understood [as] how much the plaintiff drags the defendant to different judges, one pending before one.
h Procure. That he convenes before a delegate regarding one, note in the gloss. Otherwise before an ordinary regarding another, below, same [section], chapter last. And so for many [he should obtain] letters, for if [of] one...
i Shall have done. With effect, then both will be valid. The process held by the same, according to Innocent, may be valid by the same. In this [he] expands...