[Iustiniani Institutiones]

Justice is a constant and perpetual will to assign to each person their own right.

Jurisprudence

is the knowledge of divine and human things, the science of the just and the unjust. Having therefore generally known these, and as we begin to explain the laws of the Roman people, they seem most able to be handed down most conveniently if first in a light and simple way, and afterwards in a most diligent and exact interpretation, individual matters are taught. Otherwise, if from the very beginning we burden the still raw and weak mind of the student with a multitude and variety of matters, we will effect one of two things: either we will make him a deserter of his studies, or with great labor on his part and with distrust, which

usually turns young men away, we will lead him later to that to which, led by a lighter path, he could have been brought sooner without his great labor and without any distrust. The precepts of the law are these: to live honestly, not to injure another, to assign to each his own right. Of this study there are two positions: public and private. Public law is that which pertains to the state of the Roman Republic. Private is that which pertains to the utility of individuals. It must be said therefore about private law, which is tripartitely collected. It is indeed gathered from natural precepts, or those of nations, or civil ones.

p Justice. Two things are shown under this demonstration and they are in perpetual abjection, because it cannot happen to a man, since it is written that the just man falls seven times in a day. And therefore he never remains in the same state, as in Digest, on those who are not for themselves, or in the first, paragraph "as also." Indeed, at the end, he says "assigning to each his own right," understand as much as pertains to the affection, for it cannot pertain to the act, because the one having the affection of assigning, as in paragraph 1, in the Institutes, in the preface, paragraph "on Augustus." And just as regarding marriage which is indivisible, as below, on the power of the father, in the beginning, law 3; sometimes it divides as is shown in the Code, on the republic, law 1, "by consent." Or thirdly, explain as in the summary of this title.
Voluntas Will. That is, a constant mind, that is, perpetual, like a good habit of the mind. Tully defines it thus: Justice is the habit of the mind, which distributes to each his own dignity, respecting common utility, as Plato says. Justice is a virtue which avails most in those things which avail the least. Or as I believe: Justice is a congruous disposition of the soul, correctly judging in individual matters.
Tribuens Assigning. So that he may live honestly for himself and so that he does not injure another, but rather profits him. Or say "his own right," that is, a man's merit.
Noticia Knowledge. It can be correctly read, and that word "science" is in the ablative case. Or conversely, let it be in the nominative case and let the word "knowledge" be in the ablative case, thus, Digest, title 1, in the preface, paragraph "never," for? it is necessary that a prudent man or jurist ought to be a theologian. Response: Truly, in the body of the law all these are found, as in the Code, on the holy trinity, and final chapters, law 1; Code, on holy churches, and on bishops and clergy, authentic on many where it treats specially of divine matters. And what is the mistress of the mind, justice, or law, or legal prudence? Response: Justice is a virtue, law is the executive of that virtue, jurisprudence is the science of that law. Also, justice is the good of this, law is the medium, jurisprudence is the science. Also, justice wills to assign to each his own right, law truly assists, jurisprudence teaches how we ourselves?—he wants to say that the laws were to be taught so that that might be done.
Cogtis Known. That is, after the definition of justice, of law, and of jurisprudence.
Et incipiētib⁹ And to those beginning. The dative can be read as an ablative so that it refers to what is above, and then the truth of the book is in the person of justice.
Rob. He speaks of those who are being lectured to, which he ought to explain by them.
Tradi To be taught. Namely, the laws of the Romans themselves.
Leui Light. Regarding the words, that is, simple regarding the meaning.
Diligentissima Most diligent. Regarding the subtle words.
Atqz exactissima And most exact. Regarding the subtle matter and meaning.
Interpretatione Interpretation. That is, easy teaching.
Que Which. Namely, distrust.
Auertit Turns away. Not against inconstancy, thus, Digest, on penalties, as in the case in the beginning. Whence Solomon: "Three things are unknown to me, and the fourth I know not at all: the way of a serpent upon a rock, the way of a bird flying in the air, the way of a ship in the midst of the sea, the fourth is more difficult, the way of a young man in his adolescence." Whence it is given in the restitution of their facilities, as below, on those who are not for themselves. Accursius.
Maturius Sooner. Note here for the public, he who walks plainly, walks soundly.
Iuris pcepta Precepts of the law. That is, laws to be perceived, they command something that pertains to some of these three, for not every law commands; rather, some.

punishes, some forbids, some permits, as in Digest, on laws and senate consults, law "of the law." Some counsels, as in Digest, on vindication of things, law "he who." Some exhorts, as in Code, on transactions, "acting."
Honeste Honestly. That is, as far as pertains to oneself, because honesty is a good memory, as in Digest, on the rite of nuptials, law "always," and good morals are to be kept, as in Digest, on tutors and curators, "given by these," law "it is necessary to know," penultimate paragraph. Accursius of Florence.
"What you do not wish to be done to yourself, do not do to another," as in the Decrees, in the beginning.
Suū His own right. So that he not only does not injure, but also assists; for it does not suffice to abstain from evil unless one does what is good, as is read in the Decrees, dist. 86, chapter "do not do," paragraph "if not." These words are accepted here just as above, in the definition of justice at the end. Response: Not so, there it comprehends three operations, but here only that which the first two leave behind. And note that this repeats the work of others who said in this title that he was defining law, which is the art of the good and the equitable, for whose merit one correctly calls us priests. For I say that these words which are here mean as much, for when he says "precepts of the law," through these he says "art," since an art is a collection of precepts. Also, through that which he says "to live honestly, not to injure another," it is worth as much as the good and the equitable, that is, the precepts of the law. He says this, "to assign to each his own right." I gather that for whose merit one calls us priests, that is, ministering sacred laws to each one, as here, and Digest, on the same, law 1, 2, at the end.