[Tractatus plurimi iuris]

And innocent life might be rendered safe among the wicked reference: Distinctio 3, "Factae sunt leges". And so that the good may live quietly among the wicked reference: Causa 23, quaestio 5, "Non frustra". And so that no one may take vengeance upon himself by his own rashness. Therefore, if men had remained in the state of their first disposition and innocence, the enactment of positive law would not have been necessary. For to what end would we look for [remedies such as] libels, litis contestatio, and similar things if there were no lawsuits?

Since, therefore, lawsuits and contentions have arisen from the greed and malice of men, we have need of positive law to handle affairs and resolve lawsuits by these and similar titles. But although law has emanated upon this, nevertheless, the exercise and science of pleading are most necessary reference: Distinctio 45, "Licet"; Liber Sextus, "Ut continetur". And through science and experience, all knowledge is acquired. According to that saying: "Practice and art have taught what every man knows." And according to the saying of the philosopher in the first Metaphysics: "Experience makes art, but inexperience makes chance." For every craft receives increase through exercise reference: Digest, De aurum et argentum legatorum, law "Servis legatis", paragraph "Ornatricis". Experience itself is the effective teacher of things reference: De electione, "Quaz sit", Liber Sextus. Whence the law amends the jurisconsults through the experience of things, as in the second constitution, paragraph 1. And judges can vary by experience of cases reference: Code, De iudiciis, "Certi". For the inexperienced person recognizes few things, especially concerning the forms of libels and the order of judgment, concerning which due handling requires experience. Whence Ross. Rossellus says in his book of civil law in the beginning: "It is difficult for one to know well how to propose difficult libels and handle the order of judgment, even if he is otherwise good in the laws," unless he is practiced in the exercise of cases, whether criminal or civil. For as Guil. Guillelmus Durantis says in his Speculum Mirror, in the beginning, concerning the receiving of libels,

a great danger threatens. And almost the entire force of judgments consists in conceiving them rightly reference: De iudiciis, "Examinata", paragraph "Symo", "Licet bely", with similar. And few are found fully instructed in these; indeed, there is no one who is not often led into error in these matters reference: De innuptis ecclesiae, "Adversus". Therefore, at the instance of my lords on this matter, I intend to provide and declare the forms of libels and other judicial acts, and the due and frequented order of judgments, explaining through individual acts and through the judicial parts by the means through which one arrives at the end of cases, in a competent and regulated order, as far as it is possible for me. For although I truly know myself to be insufficient for this, I shall do, however, what I can reference: Causa 23, quaestio 2, "Faciet bonum". And it is sufficient that the labor of friends is consulted in a few things, as the law says reference: Digest, De negotiorum gestis, law "Mortuos"; and law "Mortuores", in paragraph "Qui se", at the end, Digest, De administratione tutorum.

But before I come to the point, I premise for the sake of evidence that a judgment is a legitimate act of three persons: the judge, the plaintiff, and the defendant. Thus says Host. Hostiensis, defining in his Summa de iudiciis in the beginning, and Io. an. Johannes Andreae in his additions to the Speculum, title De actore in the beginning, and the doctors commonly.

In that it is said "it is an act of three persons," two things are included: namely, the process and the persons of the judgment. And although there are some judgments in which all those persons are not present, such as in a judgment of general inquisition where there is no person of the plaintiff or the defendant reference: "Bone te", De electione; and in a judgment of special inquisition which is made by the office of the judge, with no one provoking or instigating reference: De accusationibus, "Inquisitionis"—such as when a bishop inquires against a fornicating priest reference: "Qualiter", distinction 2—where the person of the plaintiff is absent.