[Tractatus plurimi iuris]

And over a notorious crime, where the person of the accuser is not required reference: De accusationibus, "Enivena". Nevertheless, the aforesaid definition still stands true, because in a special inquisition which is done by the office of the judge, fame or infamy must precede, as in the laws cited above. And that [fame] takes the place of the plaintiff, and it bears the type of the defendant, as noted there. And a general inquisition is ordered toward a special one. And thus, finally, it will be there just as in a special one, to find a plaintiff. Thus, in a judgment held over a notorious crime, it can be said that the notoriety supplies the place and role of the accuser interpretatively. And thus, in any judgment—ordinary, inquisitorial, or extraordinary—the aforesaid three persons will be had in substance: fictively, truly, or at least representatively. And thus these three persons are of the being and substance of the judgment: namely, the judge, the plaintiff, and the defendant. Yet there are also other persons who sometimes intervene in the judgment. And some of them act or defend, such as procurators, the joined person, defenders, executors, a syndic, an economist, a tutor, curators, and certain others, concerning whom Guil. Guillelmus Durantis writes in the Speculum, first part, third book, throughout. But those persons are in the judgment acting or defending in the name of another, namely in the name of the plaintiff or the defendant or both—namely, some in the name of the plaintiff, some in the name of the defendant. And thus they are not necessary. Others neither act nor defend, but are there to provide an aid to the case itself, such as advocates reference: De postulando, "Pro tutela"; De iudiciis, "Pastoralis"; "Ut lit non cont.", chapter 1. Likewise, witnesses reference: Causa 4, quaestio 3, chapter 1; De verborum significatione, "Forum", in omni. A notary, or in his place two suitable men who write the acts of the judgment reference: De probationibus, "Quoniam contra famam". And a messenger or executor who cites and reports reference: De officio delegati, "Prudentia"; "Re", De appellationibus, "Cum paratus". And those persons also do not have to be in the judgment by necessity, but for the effect, as I said above. And concerning the offices of such persons,

the exercise of the accused, and the forms by which they are appointed, and other things concerning such matters that pertain to practice, it will be made clear in due time in the process. And concerning such persons and their offices, the first book of the Decretals is occupied, and the entire first part of the Speculum iudiciale by Guil. duranti Guillelmus Durantis, because the person and the reason must be considered or sought first reference: Digest, De iure codicillorum, law 1, "Istorum quidam referunt"; De responsione, "Impub. ad dissolvendum". Now, concerning the other part of the definition, where it is said that "a judgment is an act, etc.": it should be known that for the due explanation and perfection of that judicial act, one walks through many parts and particular acts, and by a certain order, and by law and the custom of cases, regularly proceeding until the sentence is reached, which imposes an end to the business. This order of judgment and its parts are treated by the second book of the Decretals and by Guil. Guillelmus Durantis in the Speculum, part 2, throughout. And there, in the beginning of those, the father enumerates in due order the parts or members of the judicial process, at least those members which are commonly and generally contingent in most cases, although sometimes others occur, as he says there in the beginning. And some are even enumerated by the Decretals reference: "Quoniam", extra, De probationibus, though not observing the order through all things, as noted there. Of these parts of the judgment, some are of the substance of the process or the judicial order, such as the offering of the libel reference: Chapter 1, De libello oblato, in the end, in the gloss; and in Clementinae, "Saepe", De praescriptionibus, in the gloss which is on the word "necessario". Likewise, the litis contestatio the formal framing of the suit reference: De litis contestatione, chapter "unico", "Ut lit non praest.". Likewise, the conclusion reference: in the cited Clementinae, "Saepe", in the gloss "Ista bona". Likewise, the sentence, that it be brought forth in writing reference: De sententia et re iudicata, chapter "Plana", Liber Sextus. Some, however, are not of the substance, such as exceptions, replications, etc. And this judicial order should not be omitted, confused, or reversed, otherwise, from the omission, confusion, or pre-