[Tractatus plurimi iuris]

for judgments in the second part. The first rubric, namely: that he who wishes to act accusare to accuse should first consulat consult his friends, see if he has probation, and whether it is expedient for him to move a lawsuit, provide himself with an advocate, confer with those more skilled, and fortify himself, because the outcome of a lawsuit is doubtful. And since the plaintiff, with the adversary standing by, is compelled to follow the lawsuit, hence it is that the delays for deliberation do not proceed for him, but for the plaintiff. Concerning these and other articles to be investigated first, note the Speculum where it is cited first. Likewise, concerning the judge, who in a criminal case ought first to examine the person of the accuser: with what intention he is moved, what is his opinion, etc. Likewise, in a case of injuries, the judge should always aim at componendū compounding/settling the parties. In which action opposition proceeds most powerfully reference: Distinctio 90, chapter 1; and chapter "Si utendum". And since also in civil cases the judge ought to tend toward composition reference: De mutuis petitionibus, chapter 1, and composition proceeds most powerfully with the plaintiff winning, as in the additions to the Speculum, note Jo. an. Johannes Andreae in the title cited first. Whence, as the Speculum says there: It is not expedient for anyone that he be too easy and prompt to litigate because of the danger to his soul. Whence it is said in the Gospel: "If anyone wishes to take your tunic, etc., and contend in judgment, etc." reference: Matthew 5; Causa 13, quaestio 1, paragraph 1; and the Apostle: "If you have secular judgments, it is a sin in you, and you make them contemptible to God," 1 Corinthians 16; Causa 6, quaestio 1, paragraph "Ex his". And it is especially not expedient for clerics, because "no one serving God entangles himself in secular businesses" reference: 2 Timothy 2; "Ne clerici vel monachi", chapter 1, much less for religious reference: Causa 16, quaestio 1, "Monachi", because it is not fitting for the servants of God to litigate; De simonia, chapter "unico". Likewise, it is not expedient because of the doubtful outcome of the lawsuit, as I said, etc. Also note concerning a case of possession and property reference: "Pastoralis", in the beginning. Therefore, one should rather be for compounding than for contending reference: De transactionibus, "Si", with similar. Such things and similar things are called preparatory. There can also be called preparatory all

those things which precede the litis contestatio, as says Guil angli. Guillelmus Anglicus, for which makes what Guil. Guillelmus Durantis says in the Speculum, part 2, in the beginning, verse 1. Where he says that the judicial order strictly speaking is said to consist in those things which are done between the litis contestatio and the sentence, since the litis contestatio is the beginning, since before it one is not said to act, but to wish to act, because those things which precede are not strictly of the order, but are preparatory. And according to this, the first book of the Decretals, and the beginning of the second book up to the title De litis contestatione. And that which Guil. Guillelmus Durantis treats in the Speculum in the entire first part, namely concerning the persons of judges, arbitrators, assessors, plaintiffs, defendants, and other persons acting or defending in the name of others or providing aid in the judgment, and also in the second part up to the title De litis contestatione. There are also other preparatory acts which also apply after the litis contestatio. Concerning which in the Speculum, De dilationibus, paragraph 1. And five preparatory acts, concerning which we shall see in their place. These things having been premised, one must come to the point, namely to the declaration of the process and the ordinary judicial order. I shall divide the entire process into three parts, as Guil. Guillelmus Durantis also divides in the Speculum, part 2, in the beginning. The first part begins from the first vocation or citation, and lasts up to the litis contestatio, exclusively. The second part begins from the litis contestatio, and lasts up to the definitive sentence, exclusively. The third part begins from the sentence, and lasts up to its effectual execution if it has not been appealed; otherwise, if it is appealed, the execution is suspended until the cause of the appeal has been finished reference: De iureiurando, "Venientes cum pecoribus".

In the first part, all those things are expedited which occur concerning the competence or incompetence of the judge and his jurisdiction, namely whether he has jurisdiction.