[Tractatus plurimi iuris]

Guil. in the Speculum puts the auditor, he understands him to whom a certain article of the cause is committed to be expedited. If Guil. understands this about an article having the cognition of the cause annexed, then such a one is a delegate. If about a naked article not having the cognition of the cause, like an examiner of witnesses, then such an auditor is not a judge but a naked minister. Regarding whom in the chapter "Super questionibus" regarding the office of the delegate. Vincent Vincent of Spain ought not to place this member, but regarding the assessor, who it is not fitting to enumerate among judges, because he is not properly a judge, as will be patent in its place. Similarly, an arbiter and an arbitrator is not properly a judge, because an arbiter can be chosen by a private person. If it is thus, that by the act of private persons jurisdiction is not given, otherwise they do not have it. But the Speculator therefore enumerates him among judges because arbitrations are reduced to the likeness of judgments, as in the law "Arbitrium" in the Digest. Also, arbitration is voluntary, but a judgment is rendered against the unwilling, as has been said above.

A delegate is he who, from the commission of another, receives the judicial recognition of some cause. And this one, if he is from a prince, perhaps subdelegates. Whence a subdelegate is he to whom a cause or part of a cause is committed by a delegate in the second place. And thus a subdelegate is also called a delegate. Conservators and executors are also delegates.

An ordinary is he who, by his own right or by the benefit of a prince, can universally exercise jurisdiction. The Pope is therefore the ordinary of all places. Also, the bishop in his diocese, and all temporal lords in whose territory one has a domicile. Also, there are ordinaries and competent judges. Temporal lords, however, do not found their intentions by common law against all in their territory as bishops do in their dioceses, for which note the chapter "Super eo" regarding parishes, and the chapter regarding religious houses. Also, even inferiors can be ordinaries and have ordinary jurisdiction by privilege or custom.

An archbishop, however, is not the ordinary judge of his suffragan's subjects, but only in his own diocese; and over the suffragans themselves, he has ordinary jurisdiction, as in the chapter "Pastoralis" regarding the office of the ordinary. Whence he cannot be approached by a simple complaint by the subjects of the suffragans except in cases as there. Also, a legate is an ordinary in the province decreed to him.

How the plaintiff ought to conduct himself in approaching a judge.

But how the plaintiff ought to conduct himself in approaching, Guil. treats in the Speculum on the competent judge, in the section "Viso". That if he is an ordinary, the plaintiff by himself or by his procurator should approach him with a good prayer. That is, when he is not sitting for the tribunal, nor when he is eating, or is in divine service, or on the road. And he should propose his business before him by himself if he is discreet, otherwise by another. And he should ask that the adversary be cited or called to the cause, because the process ought to be initiated by citation. For citation is the foundation and principle of the judicial order, regarding which in the gloss on the chapter "Ecclesia". Just as litis contestatio the formal framing of the issue is the foundation and initiation of the suit or judgment, as has been said above.

Because the law says notably in the Institutes, regarding the principle of all actions to be instituted, it is assumed from that part of the edict which is "In ius vocando" summoning into court. If the judge is a delegate, he should approach him wherever he finds him, although sometimes he lacks a certain place and consistory. In a place, however, that is honest and at a proper hour.