[Tractatus plurimi iuris]

it would be lacking, as in the chapter Cum ex litteris, On Restitution in Integrum. And thus it comes into use that judges commonly send a single peremptory citation, and it is valid. Nor can one be appealed for this alone, as Innocent says in the aforementioned chapter first, On Dilatory Exceptions. Where he says that a sole peremptory assignment made on the first occasion is not a sufficient cause to appeal. It ought, however, to contain in this peremptory [citation] competent intervals and spaces of time, as in 24, question 3, "De illicita," and noted in chapter 1, On Dilatory Exceptions. And how large the intervals of time it ought to contain, it must be arbitrary and arbitrable by the judge based on the distance of the roads, the matter, the persons, and the quality of the time, as in the chapter Cum ex litteris, On Restitution in Integrum, and noted in chapter 1, On Dilatory Exceptions supra alleged. About which also in the Speculum, "On Citation," § "Now concerning times." If, however, three citations were made, then if the defendant does not come at the first citation term, he is considered contumacious in this regard so that he is held to the appearing plaintiff for expenses, as noted On Procurators, "Querellam." And in the Speculum, title "On Expenses," § "Next," verse "But it is asked." But for such contumacy, the other penalties of contumacy are not inflicted on the defendant, because he is not established contumacious to the point that he could be excommunicated or a mission of possession made against him for this much, as in the last chapter, § d. "On Contumacy." Unless he answered in the first citation that he would not come, because then the contumacy would be notorious. If, therefore, the word "peremptory" is not in the citation, the cited person not appearing cannot be excommunicated nor will he suffer a mission of possession, at least if the person cited is not before the trial. As for the judicial citations that occur in the process of the trial, it will be clear later. But when the citation is single and peremptory, even if it contains three terms, it suffices to appear at one term, and only after the last is there place for penalties. About this in the Speculum, "On Citation," § "Seen." And by Jo. Andreae in the additions to the Speculum, as in the processes of the executor, etc. Also, but in the form "that on such day you appear," if it is posited in the citation "you appear on Friday or Wednesday," it is understood as the first Friday or Wednesday, per law "Cum qui," Digest, On Verbal Obligations, noted in chapter Exposuit, On Dilatory Exceptions. If, however, that day is a holiday on which the defendant is called, does it constrain the cited person to appear? Whence this can happen in two ways: either because it is expressed in the citation "appear on such Sunday," or it is not expressed, but it is said "appear on the 10th day," and on this day falls a holiday. Innocent in the last chapter, On Holidays, after the recitation of opinions, seems to finally please that although an error is expressed in the citation by saying "appear on Sunday" so that then I may proceed in the cause, or if the error is tacitly present, such as if it is said in the citation "appear on the 10th day" and that falls on a Sunday, that the cited person is always held to appear. The reason is that two mandates seem to be in the citation, namely that he appear on such day, and if he should not or cannot appear on that day, nevertheless it seems to him mandated that he appear as soon as he can.

Hostiensis holds the contrary, and with him Richardus de Senis seems to hold. Joannes Calderini will be seen to say there that if the error is tacitly present, then the citation holds because it held from the beginning. Whence, although the intervening case suspends the mandate, it does not, however, relax it entirely, and thus he is held to appear on the following day. It is otherwise if the error is expressed, because then he denies that the citation holds. To avoid this today, judges are cautious by saying in the citation: "appear on the 10th day if it is a judicial day, otherwise on the next following judicial day." Yet Joannes Andreae in the alleged chapter last, § "Fe.", advised that judges hold this caution, especially because it could be that at the judge's [court] it would not be a holiday, and at the cited person's [location] it would be, as noted there by the text which is singular.