Stephani de Malescot Iuriscos. ac Belarborensis Theophilologi, de Nuptiis Liber Paradoxicus, nova & recenti methodo compositus

so that cloth may be made; an awl, so that a shoe may be made; a net, so that we may catch fish, and other things of this kind. reference to Law "Questioned," regarding an instructed estate. But prattein to act, which we interpret as "to act," pertains to prudence and virtues, and the instruments that are referred to praxis action are sufficient in themselves. For they are not sought for the sake of another. For we have clothing and a litter, so that we might use these very things when we are clothed or carried, and we do not expect any work to be done by them beyond that. And thus Aristotle concludes that life is an action, not a faction, Greek: "βίου εἶναι πρᾶξιν, ὒ ποίησιν." and he concludes that a servant is an instrument of action Greek: "πρακτικόν", when it becomes much more noble, as Cicero testifies in book 2 of his letters to Atticus. Quintilian in book 2, chapter 19, asks whether Rhetoric should be numbered among the arts that consist in acting. For some things are in contemplation and inspection; others are in acting, whose end exists and they are perfected in the act itself, and they leave nothing after the act, such as dancing. Others are in effect, which receive their end by the completion of a work that is placed before the eyes, such as painting and similar things. Thus, when the conjunction of man and woman follows consent, it seems to approach the nature of things that consist in effect; hence it is rightly considered the efficient cause. However, this difference between acting and making, by the authority of Caius in the law...