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Otherwise, if Scaevola had been questioned about the law, he would have responded most ineptly and absurdly based on abrogated law. There are those who write that Scaevola was consulted about a different matter than that for which the constitution of Marcus was issued. They say the consultation concerned a seller who had stated a condition, not that the buyer should manumit the slave, but that the slave should be free after the death of the buyer. This is very true. But they say the Divine Marcus established that a slave sold under such a condition that he should be manumitted would be free by the law itself if the buyer failed to do so. If this is so, Claudius Triphoninus is accused of the greatest foolishness, for he responded to that consultation of Scaevola based on the constitution of Marcus and decided the question proposed to Scaevola based on it. But it is not so. For Claudius writes most explicitly that the constitution of Marcus specifically covered the case in which the seller postponed liberty until the time of the buyer's death. And the Emperor Alexander in law 3, Code, "if slaves have been sold in such a way," original: "si mancip. ita fuer." shows that the same constitution pertains not only to the case in which the buyer's action of providing liberty was stipulated, but also to the one in which the sold human was ordered to be free without the buyer's act. But look, another dispute arises again from law "who at Rome" 122, section "Flavius," Digest, on verbal obligations, where Scaevola is thought to deny that a slave sold with a pact of manumission is free by the law itself, and furthermore that a penalty included in a stipulation is owed. I respond in two ways: First, that the law was taken from the books of the Digest of Scaevola, which I said were edited before the constitution of Marcus; second, that the constitution of Marcus does not hinder that response of Scaevola at all, nor does it pertain in any part to the question proposed to Scaevola. For indeed