Iul. Pacii Iuriscons. in L. frater à fratre D. de condictione indebiti, commentarius

obligation is sustained solely by natural equity. Dig. 46.3.95, § "naturalis" on the release of debts. Why is a particular natural obligation (such as the obligation with which our law is concerned) not acquired by the father rather than the son, since the peculium a sum of money or property managed by a son or slave but belonging to the father or master belongs to the father, not the son? Dig. 4.4.3, § "sed utrum." Why, finally, does a son acquire for his father? Because he is under his power. For by the same reasoning, a slave also acquires for his master. Dig. 41.1.1. And an emancipated son no longer acquires. Since, therefore, paternal power is not only civil original: "ciuis", Dig. 1.7.3 & 4, Inst. 1.8 on paternal power, but also of the ius gentium law of nations, Dig. 1.1.2, Cod. 6.26.9, Inst. 1.10 on marriage, Aristotle Politics, book 8 original: "Polit. vlt.": inasmuch as it is observed among all peoples, it follows that not only a civil obligation, but also an obligation of the ius gentium (which is called natural) is acquired by the father. But here someone will object that all men are equal by nature. Dig. 50.17.33 on the rules of law. The answer is ready: that law speaks of the natural law common to all animals. We are speaking of the ius gentium. It is certain that men are not distinguished by that natural law, but by the ius gentium, Dig. 1.1.4. We, however, look to the ius gentium when a natural obligation