Iul. Pacii Iuriscons. in L. frater à fratre D. de condictione indebiti, commentarius

is what we mean, as was shown above.

To omit what is said, that all men are equal, this pertains only to liberty. For the preceding words of that law demonstrate this, just as if the Iurisconsultus jurisconsult/legal expert had said that all men are equally free. Again, it seems to stand in the way that a father is naturally bound to his son. referencing Digest 44.7.1, § "quaesitum" below in this law, but not to himself, as we will prove below. Therefore, that obligation is not acquired by the father. I concede this. But you do not correctly infer a universal from a particular if you conclude from this that no obligation is acquired by the father. In this specific case, a father cannot be a creditor of himself. But if someone else were bound, rather than the father, it would be no absurdity if we said the father becomes the creditor. However, this objection perhaps cannot be solved by those who think that an acquisition is made for the father through the son in such a way that the obligation never subsists in the person of the son. For in this case, there is no doubt that the obligation exists in the person of the son, as it is something that cannot be acquired by the father. While they say that in this case an obligation is acquired by the father, although it is understood not to be acquired in the meantime while the peculium a sum of money or property managed by a son or slave but belonging to the father or master is with the son, they ought to confirm their opinion either with a certain law or by reason, or show us why the same thing cannot be said when someone else is bound to anyone.