De pignoribus et hypothecis theses

VI.
A mortgage, however, is a naked contract, legitimate on both sides, entered into between the contracting parties in such a way that a right in the thing arises for the creditor, while the possession of the obligated thing remains safely with the debtor in the meantime.

VII.
From which it becomes manifest that a pledge differs from a mortgage only by the sound of the name; because the latter claims a place for itself in immovable things, whereas the former in movable things. For this reason, I think there is no one who would be held in ignorance of this matter, that in countless places "pledge" is taken indifferently for "mortgage," that is, for a naked convention.

VIII.
It is beyond all controversy that a pledge can be divided in four ways: into praetorian, judicial, legal, and conventional.

IX.
It is called praetorian when a magistrate, to curb the contumacy of the defendant, without a definitive sentence, as by his edict, by a first decree, puts the actor into possession of the debtor's goods, only for the sake of preserving the thing.

X.
It is called judicial because it is constituted by the judge after a definitive sentence has been passed, for the execution of the judged matter.

XI.
Legal is that which is taken from the law by him to whom the law has given the power of that thing.

XII.
A conventional pledge, about which we are only discussing at present, is properly called that which results from the express or tacit will of the parties for the greater security of the creditor.

XIII.