Disputatio de phrenitide

the operation of the stomach, liver, etc., has its own private organs because they are different, peculiar, and proper operations. Now, truly, discourse, imagination, and memory are peculiar operations; therefore, it is necessary that they have proper organs.

XVIII.
Secondly, they prove it in this manner: the more perfect operations are, the more instruments they require; as animals, because they have more perfect ones than plants, also have more and more perfect organs. Wherefore, since the rational soul is nobler than the sensitive, it must necessarily also have more organs.

XIX.
Their third reason is as follows: if all such operations were done in one part, they would also be done by a single temperament; and if this temperament were changed, all such operations would necessarily be offended at the same time. However, as experience teaches, and Galen also testifies in On the Differences of Symptoms 3, when he says that imagination is damaged without the discourse being damaged, etc. Therefore, it is easily apparent that such operations cannot proceed from a single temperament, and consequently not from one part of the brain.

XX.
They try to prove that these operations occur in distinct places of the brain thus: all these operations depend upon sense, according to the dictum of Aristotle: "There is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the sense." Therefore, since these operations have this order after the sense, such that phantasms are first presented to the phantasy, then to the discourse, and finally to the memory, reason seems to demand that, just as these images first exit from the anterior part while they travel into the brain, thus the imagination holds the first place near the senses; the discourse, the second; and the memory, the third.

XXI.
Fifthly, they argue thus: imagination does not happen through an impression