Disputatio de phrenitide

XXVIII.
That memory is not distinguished from phantasy by reality and subject (as they wish) is clear, firstly: because entities are not to be multiplied without necessity. For if so many diverse faculties differing in reality and subject must be posited, it is also necessary that so many diverse instruments and even diverse objects be posited. But since there is only one instrument of the inner sense, and one object: only one internal sense ought also to be posited: which, according to the different way it relates to sensibles, also bears different names: for if it first apprehends the sensibles which are offered to it by the exterior senses, it is called the common sense: this, however, happens while external sensibles are present, not indeed that the common sense cannot know absent things, but because the exterior senses cannot offer external sensibles without the presence of the object: but if this internal faculty judges, it is called phantasy or Imagination: and when it preserves sensible species mental representations, it is called Memory: which, however, are not distinguished from one another by subject but only by reason, as Aristotle seems to prove.

XXIX.
Since, therefore, it has been demonstrated by me up to this point that those things which have been supposed by them are false, their reasons are also easily answered. Although, indeed, many things have been said before by others against the Arabs and their imitators concerning this distinction of places, according to the opinion of the Greeks: nevertheless, since even the Greeks do not seem to feel correctly in this matter, I will attempt to answer their reasons based on the foundations previously brought forward, suppressing all authority.

XXX.
Regarding the first, when they assert that reason is primarily offended in this illness, they seem to err, because as we demonstrated above: our intellect is impassible, nor does it exercise its operations through a corporeal instrument, but it contemplates the phantasms mental images that are offered to it by the phantasy, according to the dictum: "It is necessary for the intellect to contemplate phantasms."