Disputatio de phrenitide

When, however, they say that reason is always harmed in this affection, I concede it, but not primarily and in itself, but rather by accident, and the reason is because the phantasy, which ought to offer phantasms to the intellect, is harmed. When, however, they add that reason is harmed while others are unhurt, I say it is false because of the reasons brought forward earlier.

XXXI.

Nor does the second conclude anything, and the reason is because it only proves that reason is harmed in phrenitis, which we also willingly concede, but by accident. Regarding the authorities, however, it must be said that since they affirm something against reason, we are not compelled to believe them.

XXXII.

Their arguments, by which they try to prove that those faculties are placed in different locations, conclude just as much. For what they first say, that proper and different actions require proper and different organs, I concede to be true if the actions are truly different and are instrumental: but reasoning, since it is not an organic action, also does not require an instrument: and imagination and memory, since they do not differ by reality or subject, but only by reason, do not require diverse organs.

XXXIII.

To the second, I respond: The Rational soul is used in two ways. Firstly, for the universal soul of man, as it is distinguished from the soul of brutes. Secondly, for that part which is distinguished from the other part, namely the sensitive, and is endowed with Reason: Now if they take the Rational soul in the first meaning, their argument is very true. For man, since he has more perfect actions than brutes, rightly and deservedly also requires more organs; if, however, they understand it regarding the ratiocinative faculty as it is distinguished from the sensitive faculty, their argument has no place: for as it was demonstrated before, it operates without an organ.