Endoxa philosophica & medica

that arise from putrid matter do not generate things like themselves.
XXIV.
Since the seed of plants is a κύημα conception/product, they did not require a distinction of male and female: nevertheless, according to some similarity, some can be called males, some females.
XXV.
Furthermore, just as an animal is more excellent than a plant: so also sensation, through which living things are called animals, is more eminent than vegetative power.
XXVI.
Sensation is a passive faculty. For it is moved by the sensible. But this hinders nothing from it being properly and formally called an active power.
XXVII.
But that passion is not corruptive, but rather a τελελὴς fulfillment/perfection, or the health of that which is in potentiality by that which is in act.
XXVIII.
Therefore, it is led into act by an object, and indeed an external one. Hence we cannot sense when we wish.
XXIX.
Aristotle, after affections proper to living things and animals, finally speaks about health and disease, as about things that are almost the final and ultimate matters to be examined in physical business: for he dealt with them in a little book whose beginning, among the small natural works, stands last. And for this reason, cleverly, as he does everything, the same man says in On Sense and Sensibles: Where the natural philosopher defines, there the elegant physician begins. The natural philosopher defines in terms of health: and from the notion of the end, which is health, Medicine begins.
XXX.
MEDICINE is not a science: but neither is it an art properly speaking. They think more correctly, however, who count it among the arts, than those who place it among the sciences.