Endoxa philosophica & medica

XXXI.

The same, if we use words properly, can be called neither Theoretical nor Practical, but only effective: unless, once a comparison of the parts among themselves is made, these names are attributed to it by similarity.

XXXII.

Its end, as I have said, is health, whether to be maintained or to be recovered. Hence, by the Philosopher in 12 Metaphysics, Medicine itself is in a certain way said to be health.

XXXIII.

But health is the natural disposition of the body, from which integral actions primarily proceed.

XXXIV.

Because, however, the parts of the body, in which it inheres as a πρώτῳ δεκτικῷ primary receptacle, are either similar or instrumental, or even participate in a unity that is common to both: health also will be either similar, instrumental, or common.

XXXV.

The reasoning for disease is equal. For it is concerned with the same subject. But there are not only as many genera of diseases as of health: but there are also as many species of health as there are of diseases. For to every disease its own opposite health is assigned.

XXXVI.

Three genera of diseases, therefore, are given: Intemperance, organic disease, and solution of continuity: and therefore it is not ἀμεθολογία lack of method, but an error, to inflict another genus of disease, which they call of the whole substance, besides intemperance, upon similar parts.

XXXVII.

For the matter of diseases of the moderns is either not disease, or they are reduced to the posited genera. But the forms of corruption (for so they are called by their inventors) are either not in the number of diseases, or most of them are outside of intemperance