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Graseck, Paul · 1588

still more potent than those to whom the same was obligated before the day or condition.
XXIV.
For although the obligation eventually begins with effect from the time of the day or condition: nevertheless, with the day or condition existing, it is pulled back to the time of the contract.
XXV.
This holds true simply in an obligation for a day.
XXVI.
In an obligation conceived under a condition, however, it only holds if it is a condition that could exist even against the will of the debtor.
XXVII.
For if it is of such a kind that it cannot be fulfilled except when the debtor is willing, the obligation of the mortgage is not to be referred to the time of the contract, but to the existing condition; and thus the prior will not be more potent.
XXIIX.
Furthermore, the rule holds a place, not only when those having a tacit, that is, a legal mortgage contend among themselves, or those having an express one: but also when these compete with those.
XXIX.
It also makes no difference whether all claim a conventional pledge, or all a prætorium magisterial or judicial one, or all.